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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The world economy has experienced persistent growth in the last decades. In this regard
the driving factors for success are technological progress, economies of scale, increased
productivity and e¢ ciency and improvements in allocation of resources amongst others.
However, the growth pattern di¤ers signicantly over time among countries and even within
countries at regional level.
In this context, the Peoples Republic of China shows an outstanding example and
reveals an unprecedented development. It is widely considered to be one of the most suc-
cessful developing countries in modern times. Chinas sustained growth fuelled historically
unprecedented poverty reduction. For this reason Chinas economic success is an interesting
object of analysis to economists. Particularly, with regard to the experimental programs
in major domains of Chinas economic reform the country provides an excellent example
for the analysis and understanding of development, development policies and their e¤ects.
Since the economic reform in 1978 China gradually undertook the open door policy.1 First,
the government established Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in selected coastal cities for the
purpose of stimulating exports and attracting foreign investment. In a second step an im-
plementation of a series of reforms in the foreign trade system and a promotion of foreign
direct investment (FDI) inow followed.2 But even though the country features enormous
1For a better understanding Appendices A1.1 and A1.2 and Table A1.1 and Figure A1.1 give a descriptive
overview of the divisions of administrative areas, the characteristics of the provinces and of historical
economic development of the Peoples Republic of China.
2Amongst others Chen and Feng (2000), Yao and Zhang (2001a, 2002), Chen and Fleisher (1996), Zhang
and Song (2000), Madariaga and Poncet (2005), Cheung and Lin (2004) and Yao (2006) analyse the e¤ect of
the open door policy on economic development and point out that exports and inward FDI have a benecial
2economic growth, the growth rates are not distributed uniformly over the country. The
preferential open door policy and lower transportation costs promoted the coastal provinces
to develop superior, while the interior provinces showed only moderate growth rates and
still a large part of the population is living in poverty. This uneven development involved
an increase in inequality within the country.3
In this regard, China provides a particularly suitable example for the analysis of its
successful economic development but also its rising inequality. The major questions to
analyse are: What explains the di¤erences in growth across Chinese province? What are
the determinants that drive high economic growth in the coastal region, and what causes
the inland province to lag behind? In other words, what factors are responsible for the
unequal development of Chinas provinces? Are the provinces on a converging path with
the option of decreasing inequality or is there a divergence process with the result of rising
inequality? What are the reasons for the rising inequality of the last decades? And nally,
how do growth, inequality and poverty a¤ect each other? This comprehends the questions
to which extend income growth translates into poverty reduction and how the degree of
inequality impacts economic growth. The following three chapters intend to nd answers
for these questions. All three chapters capture di¤erent kinds of problems and can be read
independently of each other, although the questions analysed are highly related with each
other. Each chapter has its own introduction and reviews the relevant theoretical and
empirical literature to the issue.
In chapter two we start with the analysis of the determinants of Chinas success story
and investigate if there is a catch up process across the provinces. The subsequent chapter
investigates the role of factor inequality on income inequality on the provincial level. We
pick up the determinants of growth identied in chapter two and analyse to what extent
the unequal distribution in this growth factors across provinces has an e¤ect on the in-
e¤ect on GDP growth in China.
3 In this context Madariaga and Poncet (2005) and Bao et al. (2002) suggest that the unequal devel-
opment is also driven by the advantageous geographic location of the coastal region which translates into
lower international transaction costs.
3come inequality in the country. Finally, chapter four extends the development debate by
analysing the pairwise causal interactions of growth, inequality and poverty. In this context
we investigate the issue to which extent the poor participate in the overall income growth
and in turn, if the decline in poverty shows a benecial e¤ect on growth. How does the
income distribution e¤ect growth and poverty reduction and vice versa?
Chapter two of the thesis is based on the paper "International integration and the
determinants of regional development in China" by Gries, T. and Redlin, M. published
in Economic Change and Restructuring in 2011. It provides empirical evidence on the
determinants of growth. Concerns about the duration of Chinas growth and hence the
question of a permanent signicant contribution of China to world economic growth relate,
amongst other things, to the problem of reducing regional disparity in China. While
Chinas high average growth is driven by a small number of rapidly developing provinces,
the majority of provinces have experienced a more moderate development. To obtain broad
continuous growth, it is important to identify the enhancing factors of provincial growth.
Therefore, we introduce a stylized model of regional development for a single backward
region which is characterized by two pillars. First, international integration indicated by
FDI and/or trade lead to imitation of international technologies, technology spill-overs and
temporary dynamic scale economies.4 The imitation process is a¤ected by the technology
gap between the backward region and the industrialised world. If the domestic stock of
technology is low, it is relatively easy to increase the technology position by adopting
foreign designs. However, the process becomes increasingly di¢ cult as the technology gap
narrows. In this respect, technological progress in a backward economy is modelled as a
process of endogenous catching up relative to an exogenous growth path of a technology
leader.5 Second, in addition to international capital the nal output sector uses human
4 International knowledge spill-over and positive technological externalities from the inux of FDI were
modelled by Markusen and Venables (1999).
5This idea is based on the Veblen-Gerschenkron e¤ect (Veblen, 1915 and Gerschenkron, 1962) of catching
up to foreign technologies.
4capital and domestic real capital to produce a homogeneous nal good.6 These factors are
available through interregional factor mobility. In summary the essential determinants of
the speed of convergence and the nal relative convergence position are modelled as the
endowment of capital and human capital, technology relevant government expenditure and
international (and domestic) transaction costs connected to exports and FDI and hence
the share of FDI.
In the next step we test the model empirically. The literature in the context of Chinas
growth determinants and convergence is large and still growing. Yet, empirical evidence
is mixed and existing studies draw an inconsistent picture.7 The results depend to a large
extend on the choice of estimation methods. In this regard we use two General Method
of Moments (GMM) estimators, namely the di¤erence GMM estimator developed by Ar-
relano and Bond (1991) and the system GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond
(1998), and in addition to various sources of Chinese o¢ cial statistics corrected income and
investment data on provincial level for the period 1991-2004 to test the predictions from
our theoretical model of regional development. The results of the growth regression provide
a negative and signicant lagged GDP per capita that indicates a catching up, non-steady
state process across Chinas provinces. Some sort of catching up or adjustment process
seems to be characteristic for Chinas provinces. In other words, on the conditioning set of
all other explanatory variables initially poorer provinces tend to have higher growth rates.
This nding is predicted by the theoretical model. In the model this process is driven
by technological imitation and spill-overs originally entering China through international
integration. The catching up process is driven by the relative technology position of the
region compared to the technological leader. During this period of rapid catching up scale
6Based on growth regressions empirical studies of Yao (2006), Fleisher, Li and Zhao (2005), Yao and
Zhang (2001a and 2002), Wang and Yao (2003), Madariaga and Poncet (2005), Chen and Feng (2000), Chen
and Fleisher (1996) and Démurger (2001) conrm the importance of these factors on economic growth in
China.
7 In this regard studies by Chen and Fleisher (1996), Cai, Wang and Du (2002), Choi and Li (2000), Wu
(1999), Chen and Feng (2000), Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996), Yudong and Weeks (2003), Raiser (1998)
and Gundlach (1997) support the convergence hypothesis while studies by Pedroni and Yao (2006), Yudong
and Weeks (2003) and Yao and Zhang (2001a, 2001b, 2002) nd divergence.
5economies are additional driving forces of development. Positive and signicant coe¢ cients
for FDI and trade conrm the underlying theory and support the importance of interna-
tional integration and technology imitation. Highly signicant human and real capital
intensies the importance of these growth restricting factors. This result indicates that the
growth process in China is not only a phenomenon caused by foreign rms investing in a
poor country; rather it has strong and important domestic components. However, other
potentially important factors like labour or government expenditures are insignicant or
even negative. With regard to labour this result is not surprising, as long as pure labour is
not a growth restricting factor.8 With respect to the theoretical model the negative result
of government expenditures suggests that we have an ine¢ cient investment in this kind of
government activities.
After analysing the question of convergence and detecting the determinants of Chinas
growth in chapter two, chapter three investigates the role of factor inequality on income
inequality on the provincial level. This chapter results from the paper "Chinas provincial
disparities and the determinants of provincial inequality" by Gries, T. and Redlin, M.
published in the Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies in 2009. It explains
the growth-inequality nexus for Chinas provinces and the major question is how the uneven
distribution of growth determining factors a¤ects income inequality.9
We introduce a theoretical model of provincial development that consists of two regions
and studies the interactions of a mutually dependent development process. International
spill-over and externalities through FDI and trade and infrastructure are relevant determi-
nants of growth and development.10 Incoming trade and FDI induce imitation and hence
8The theoretical model follows the ideas of Lewis (1954) where a country has a surplus of labour in the
rural sector that can be added to the growth restricting factors as needed. Pure labour can be added to or
withdrawn without a¤ecting output.
9Analysing the economic development of the Peoples Republic of China Kanbur and Zhang (2005),
Huang, Kuo and Kao (2003), Li and Zhao (1999) and Wan (1998) nd statistical evidence of increasing
provincial disparities between the coast and the interior and rural and urban. Chen and Fleisher (1996),
Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996), Zhang, Liu and Yao (2001), Wang (2003) and Yao and Zhang (2001b) use
the concept of sigma convergence. The results show that inequality has increased in past decades.
10See e.g. Fujita and Thisse (2002) or Kelly and Hageman (1999).
6productivity growth. As in chapter two the dynamics of the model are not driven by accu-
mulation but by technological catching up. The developing province acquires technologies
by imitating foreign designs from international technology leaders. The regional govern-
ment can inuence the economy by changing international transaction costs and providing
a public infrastructure. Mobile domestic capital reinforces disparity e¤ects. As domestic
capital can move between the two provinces, it migrates to the high-productivity and high-
interest province. Inowing capital and the resulting additional technological growth will
drive a process of both acceleration and agglomeration. In this process, the success of one
province is driven at the expense of the other with the consequence of rising disparities.
The implications of the theoretical model are tested. As the central intention of the
paper is to explain provincial disparity, we directly relate income disparity (indicated by
the contribution to the per capita income Theil index) to the disparity of selected income
determining factors (indicated by the contribution to every other Theil index of the deter-
minants). According to Tsui (2007) and Wan, Lu and Chen (2007) we use decomposition
techniques to quantify the provincial contribution to the overall income inequality and the
inequality of the growth determinants. In a rst step we compute the Theil index for GDP
growth and for each growth determinant over all provinces. Furthermore, the overall Theil
index is broken down by the provincescontributions to the overall inequality and we calcu-
late the decomposed Theil index for the eastern, central and western regions. The results
reveal that not all provinces contribute to the countrys inequality to the same degree. The
decomposition by provinces shows that especially the coastal provinces strongly inate the
Theil index to a high degree, while the central and western provinces have only a minor
impact. This indicates that inter-provincial inequality in China is driven mainly by a few
prosperous provinces. The decomposition by regions conrms this result and shows that
the inequality within the western region and the central region has only a slight impact. In
particular, the inequality within the eastern region and between the three regions is what
drives the Theil index. To identify the sources of this inequality in a second step we regress
the provincial contribution to income inequality on the contributions to the inequality of all
7growth determining factors. We use xed e¤ect panel estimation for 28 Chinese provinces
over the period 19912004.
The results conrm the theoretical framework and suggest a direct link between the
factors that determine regional income and regional disparity. More specically, it is ap-
parent that disparities in trade, domestic capital and infrastructure have a positive impact
on the provincial income Theil disparity. Like income disparity these determinants show
also an increasing trend in inequality which is mainly driven by a few coastal provinces. In
comparison to this the Theil index of FDI is more evenly distributed and shows a decreas-
ing trend. This results in a negative e¤ect of FDI inequality on income inequality. This is
also the case with the provincial disparity in human capital and government expenditure.
The disparity of human capital continuously decreased over the period of investigation
while the disparity in government activities is driven by completely di¤erent provinces
compared with income inequality. Therefore, three decades of government reforms led to
an extraordinary success of some provinces and also contrarily to increasing inequality.
However, government expenditures and public human capital investments seemed to have
a stabilizing e¤ect on provincial disparity.
Finally, chapter four is based on the paper "Short-run and long-run dynamics of growth,
inequality and poverty in the developing world" by Gries, T. and Redlin, M. of the Center
for International Economics Working Paper Series. This chapter focuses on the interde-
pendent relationships between growth, inequality and poverty.11 These phenomena are
central elements of the process of growth and development. However, the mutual e¤ects
and directions of causality have been, and remain, one of the most controversial issues.
In the rst step of our analysis we review some fundamental theoretical relations be-
tween income growth, inequality and poverty. In the illustrated model the variables are
connected through two engines of income growth, namely increasing capital intensity and
11Bourguignon (2004) refers to this relationship as the poverty-growth-inequality triangle and suggests
that there is a two-way relationship between growth and distribution which can be divided into the e¤ects
of growth on distribution and the e¤ects of inequality on growth. Furthermore, the combination of both
variables has an e¤ect on absolute poverty and poverty reduction.
8technical progress. Although the model provides some theoretical linkages between the
variables it is not able to identify possible causalities between the variables. So in the next
step we analyse the causal relations empirically.
The purpose is to rst examine a general relationship between income growth, inequality
and poverty for the developing world using a broad panel of developing countries. In the
following we focus on China and examine the relations for the country separately.
The general analysis starts with panel unit root tests12 which indicate that the vari-
ables are integrated of order one, so in the next step we test for cointegration.13 The test
results indicate that all three pairs of variables exhibit a cointegration relationship. In this
case an error correction framework is the appropriate choice for testing for causalities.14
Following Yasar, Nelson and Rejesus (2006) we apply Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) techniques on a generalised one-step panel error correction models (ECM) to es-
timate the pairwise short-run and long-run dynamics for income growth and changes in
inequality and poverty in a panel of 114 developing countries as well as four income-related
and six regional subpanels for 1981 to 2005. The results suggest that in nearly all cases
the variables exhibit a short-run and long-run relationship. The ndings reveal positive
bidirectional causality between growth and inequality. In other words, higher changes in
inequality, measured by changes in the Gini coe¢ cient, generate higher economic growth
and higher economic growth causes an increase in the changes of inequality. By contrast,
the short-run e¤ect is negative and highly signicantly for both income and inequality. This
means that in the short run rising inequality is harmful for growth and likewise an increase
in income growth causes a reduction in inequality. Concerning the dynamics between in-
come growth and changes in poverty the results show clear negative short-run and long-run
relationships between these variables. In other words, higher economic growth reduces the
extent of poverty measured by changes in the headcount, and in turn falling poverty gen-
12We use the IPS test by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and the Fisher-type test by Maddala and Wu
(1999) and Choi (2001).
13The pairwise cointegration is tested using the panel cointegration test developed by Pedroni (1999,
2004).
14See Engle and Granger (1987).
9erates higher income growth. Consequently, it becomes apparent that the growth process
raises not only the mean income of the country but also the income of the poor and lifts
a fraction of the poor population out of poverty. Yet, the results of the subpanels show
that the level of development a¤ects the poverty-reducing e¤ect of growth. Income growth
has beneted the poor regions far less. Finally, with respect to the relationship between
changes in inequality and changes in poverty the long-run e¤ect is positive and signicant
in both directions indicating that higher inequality generates higher poverty and reversed
a rise in the headcount causes a rise in the Gini coe¢ cient. However, the short-run e¤ect
is only signicant and positive when poverty is the dependent variable.
After analysing general relations in a panel of developing countries, in the next step
we focus on China and examine the causal relationships between growth, inequality and
poverty using more di¤erentiated data for the country on rural and urban level. Since
the variables are integrated of order one but not cointegrated in this case the concept
of Granger causality is the appropriate choice (Granger 1969). Concerning the relations
between growth and inequality, the results show a negative Granger causality running from
growth to inequality. This means that higher income growth Granger causes a decline in
inequality measured by changes in the Gini coe¢ cient. As in the general panel the results
for China conrm a negative relationship between growth and poverty in both directions,
indicating that higher income growth Granger causes a reduction in poverty and vice versa.
Finally, the results concerning the causal relationships between inequality and poverty
indicate only a negative causality running from poverty to inequality, so decreasing poverty
generates an increase in inequality.
In summary, we show that growth, income distribution and poverty reduction are
strongly inter-related, so a development strategy would require e¤ective, country-specic
combinations of growth and distribution policies.
This monograph contributes to the existing research for the following three aspects:
 By combining a theoretical model based on international integration, imitation and
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interregional factor mobility with an empirical examination of the model this thesis
seeks to close up the gap between theoretical analysis and empirical research. The
empirical growth analysis is mainly motivated with the dissatisfaction with previous
empirical studies. The literature in the context of Chinas growth determinants and
convergence is large and still growing. Yet, empirical evidence is mixed and existing
studies draw an inconsistent picture. The results depend to a large extend on the
choice of the period. Furthermore, estimation methods and the selection of control
variables show also a signicant impact on the quality and the quantity of the results.
This thesis extends the existing literature by using advanced estimation methods in
a combination with revised provincial data and a selection of appropriate control
variables. We apply two estimation techniques for dynamic panels: the di¤erence
GMM estimator developed by Arrelano and Bond (1991) and the system GMM esti-
mator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Using these econometric techniques
we account for province-specic e¤ects, we can include dependent variables as regres-
sors and control for endogeneity of all explanatory variables, and hence can provide
unbiased and e¢ cient estimates.
 With regard to the inequality analysis in chapter three we pick up the idea of directly
addressing the phenomenon of disparity. We suggest a direct explanation of provincial
disparity measured by the per capita income Theil index. Therefore, in our estimation
we directly relate income disparity to the disparity of selected income determining
factors. The decomposition of the Theil index by regions and provinces allows to
identify to which degree the regions and provinces contribute to the overall inequality
and how the growth determining factors are distributed across China. In addition
to this we can estimate if the disparity of an income determining provincial variable
positively or negatively contributes to the disparity of per capita income.
 The causality analysis in chapter four expands the existing literature by considering
short-run and long-run dynamics between growth, inequality and poverty. It ac-
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counts for all possible relationships between these three variables by pairs, so we can
clearly identify the causal directions of the triangle. Furthermore, panel-based error
correction models are applied to explore the pairwise relationship between growth,
inequality and poverty for a large panel of developing countries. We can identify if
the causal e¤ects are stationary long-term relations or more short-term transitory
observations. Contrary to the most often applied regression approach, where the
e¤ect of a variable and a set of conditional variables is analysed on the variable of
interest, our focus is to identify a possible causal relationship. In addition to this
the methodology allows to analyse the overall picture of economic growth, inequality
and poverty as well as their interdependencies in connection. Beyond that, a segmen-
tation of the data by income and geographic location allows us to capture possible
income-related and regional di¤erences. And nally, we use a panel data set for rural
and urban China to analyse China as one of the developing countries in more detail.
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Chapter 2
International integration and the determinants of
regional development in China
This chapter is based on the paper International integration and the determinants of re-
gional development in Chinaby Gries, T. and Redlin, M. published in Economic Change
and Restructuring in 2011.
2.1 Introduction
For more than a decade the Peoples Republic of China has experienced very successful
development. An outstanding average growth in real GDP per capita,1 the unprecedented
boom in foreign direct investment (FDI), and the sustained increase in trade are of impres-
sive dimensions. This positive economic development caused an enormous improvement in
Chinas standard of living and had an important impact on the global economy. However,
the development of China is somehow deceptive considering that measured in GDP per
capita, China is still a poor developing country.2 Furthermore, China seems to be a­ icted
by growing regional disparities. The regional Gini coe¢ cient increased from 0.35 in 1995 to
0.43 in 2004. Accelerated growth and increasing provincial inequality provoked great pub-
lic interest and became a focus of numerous studies. Analysing the economic development
of the coast and the interior and the rural and urban regions Kanbur and Zhang (2005),
Huang, Kuo and Kao (2003), Li and Zhao (1999) and Wan (1998) nd statistical evidence
1Average growth of the last ten years (1998-2007) is 9.79 per cent (Source: Penn World Table 6.3).
2With a GDP per capita (PPP) of $8,400 the Peoples Republic of China was ranked 117th of 225
countries in 2011 (Source: The World Factbook 2012).
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of increasing provincial disparities. Numerous studies try to analyse this rising inequality
using the concept of - and -convergence. The dominant nding in the literature is that
inequality measured by -convergence has increased during the past decades (Chen and
Fleisher 1996, Jian, Sachs and Warner 1996, Zhang, Liu and Yao 2001, Wang 2003 and
Yao and Zhang 2001b). The question of regional disparity is not just a Chinese problem.
Regional convergence can be regarded as an indicator of the continuity of the rapid growth
process. A scenario of convergence indicates that Chinas average growth is not driven
solely by a small number of rapidly developing regions and so it may be somewhat sus-
tainable. Therefore, the question of the duration of Chinese growth and in turn of Chinas
permanent and signicant contribution to the world economy is central for the convergence
of the Chinese regional growth process.
Chen and Fleisher (1996) nd evidence of conditional convergence of per capita produc-
tion from 1978 to 1993 when controlling for employment, physical capital, human capital,
and coastal location. Further, Cai, Wang and Du (2002) support this nding for the pe-
riod 1978 to 1998. Using panel data Choi and Li (2000) report convergence within Chinas
provinces from 1978 to 1994. They argue that the poorer regions have higher convergence
rates and hence catch up with the wealthier ones. This nding is also supported by Wu
(1999). Results by Chen and Feng (2000), Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996), Yudong and
Weeks (2003) also support the conditional convergence hypothesis, and Raiser (1998) and
Gundlach (1997) report evidence even for absolute convergence.
However, using non-stationary panel techniques Pedroni and Yao (2006) argue that
since 1978 per capita incomes in the majority of the provinces has appeared to be diverging.
They show that this divergence process cannot be attributed to either the presence of
geographically-oriented convergence clubs, or to the fact that some provinces run open-door
policies while others do not. Yudong and Weeks (2003) indicate a system-wide divergence
during the reform period, which in their opinion is a consequence of the technology gap
between the coastal and the interior provinces. Yao and Zhang (2001a, 2001b, 2002) also
have found evidence of regional income divergence in the last decades, which is explained
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by an increase in the average income gap between the coast and the inland, rather than
by an increase in the variance within either the coastal or the inland regions. In summary,
the convergence literature draws an inconsistent picture.
With respect to the determinants of the provincial growth process many studies focus on
capital in form of physical and human capital, factors inuencing openness, the government,
and geographical location.
Physical capital stock persistently shows a signicant impact on GDP growth in China
(Yao 2006, Fleisher, Li and Zhao 2005, Yao and Zhang 2001a and 2002, Wang and Yao
2003 and Madariaga and Poncet 2005).
With respect to human capital it can be observed that besides the rapid economic
development and high economic growth in the last years, endowment of human capital is
also improving steadily, especially in the eastern provinces of China. Using the number of
students enrolled in higher education as a proxy for human capital in a growth regression
Yao (2006) and Chen and Feng (2000) estimate positive and signicant coe¢ cients. While
Chen and Fleisher (1996) use university graduates/population, other studies by Fleisher, Li
and Zhao (2005), Démurger (2001), Yao and Zhang (2001a) use secondary school enrolment
as a proxy. All arrive at the conclusion that human capital contributes signicantly to
growth and welfare. Wang and Yao (2003) construct a new measure of human capital
stock using average years of schooling and also nd a positive e¤ect.3 Arayama and Miyoshi
(2004) argue that the contribution of human capital is rather substantial in the central and
western regions.
Apart from capital and human capital, there is a general view that economic integra-
tion has a strong impact on regional development in China. Since the start of the open
door policy and the implementation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the early 1980s
China has made signicant steps towards international integration and attracted many
foreign direct investors. The importance of economic integration and openness for Chinas
3However, Soto (2002) and Portela, Alessie and Teulings (2006) argue that average years of schooling
seem to have been estimated with considerable errors. Furthermore, it has to be noted that most of the
human capital proxies do not account for di¤erences in education quality between countries or regions.
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provinces is broadly acknowledged. Particularly the e¤ects of FDI and trade on Chinas
regional growth have been studied in a number of papers. While Chen and Feng (2000) and
Yao and Zhang (2001a, 2002) identify positive e¤ects for exports in the last decades, Chen
and Fleisher (1996), Zhang and Song (2000) and recently Yao (2006) have pointed out that
both exports and FDI have a strong and positive e¤ect on economic growth. Based on
an analysis of 196 Chinese cities from 1990 to 2002, Madariaga and Poncet (2005) demon-
strate that cities take advantages not only of their own nancial openness but also of FDI
ows received by neighbouring provinces. Cheung and Lin (2004) argue that inward FDI
can have benecial e¤ects on innovation activity and growth via various spill-over chan-
nels such as reverse engineering, labour mobility, demonstration e¤ects, suppliercustomer
relationships, and so on. They nd evidence of positive spill-over e¤ects of FDI on the
number of domestic patent applications for the period 1995-2000.
Another set of studies focuses on the impact of geographic factors on growth and
disparities. The advantageous location of the coastal provinces is discussed in the context
of lower transportation costs and a more successful open door policy. For example, Bao
et al. (2002) argue that spatial and topographic advantages promote higher returns on
capital investment in the coastal provinces, thus attracting more FDI and migrant labour
to a region and causing growth. Madariaga and Poncet (2005) and Bao et al. (2002)
point out that geography, captured by international transaction costs, is responsible for a
signicant part of successful growth of the coastal belt. Furthermore, Chen and Fleisher
found that convergence is conditional on coastal location, amongst others, while Yao and
Zhang (2001b and 2002) use an augmented Solows growth model and construct diverging
clubs to identify that remote regions cannot catch-up with their eastern counterparts due
to the long distance to economic centres.
In this paper the economy is a small region integrated into the world economy. The re-
gion is located in a developing country and characterised by a technological gap compared
to leading industrialised countries. In this stylized economy an internationally traded -
nal good is produced with human capital and real capital and internationally mobile real
16
foreign capital. All trading transactions are directed at world markets. Due to positive
externalities, incoming FDI induces imitation and hence productivity growth. The regional
government can inuence the economy by changing international transaction costs (trans-
port costs as well as barriers to international trade and investments), and providing the
public infrastructure required for imitation.
The empirical part examines the determinants of per capita income growth for 28
Chinese provinces over the period 1991-2004. We apply two estimation techniques for
dynamic panels: the di¤erence GMM estimator developed by Arrelano and Bond (1991)
and the system GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Using these
econometric techniques we account for province-specic e¤ects, we can include dependent
variables as regressors and control for endogeneity of all explanatory variables, and hence
can provide unbiased and e¢ cient estimates. Our analysis is based on revised GDP and
investment data from Hsueh and Li (1999).
2.2 A model of regional development
For a developing country access to relevant production factors, international spill-over and
externalities through technologies and infrastructure are relevant determinants of growth
and development.4 While the idea of New Economic Geography (NEG) (Krugman 1991)
basically works through increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition, market size
and pecuniary externalities, the idea in this paper is slightly di¤erent. Within a neoclassical
model, we introduce technical and information externalities in the imitation process. The
main reason for rms locating in a certain region hinges upon easy access and proximity
to international technologies and a pool of human capital. In the discussion of this process
Glaeser et al. (1992) point to the distinction between Jacobs (1969) and MAR (Marshall-
Arrow-Romer) externalities. MAR externalities focus on knowledge spill-over processes
between rms in the same industries. MAR externalities were discussed rst by Marshall
4See e.g. Fujita and Thisse (2002, ch.11), or Kelly and Hageman (1999).
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(1890 [1920]) and Arrow (1962). Starting with Romer (1986) this kind of spill-over process
plays a crucial role in many models of the new growth theory. Jacobs externalities are
not industry specic but general. They occur between rms that do not need to be in the
same industry cluster. From an empirical point of view both externalities seem to matter.
Glaeser et al. (1992) found evidence of Jacobs externalities while Black and Henderson
(1999) and Kelly and Hagemann (1999) identied MAR externalities.
Taking these ideas of externalities and international spill-over as the point of departure,
we develop a basic neoclassical model of growth for a single backward region. Externalities
will lead to temporary dynamic scale economies and drive the technical imitation process.
The dynamics of the model are not driven by accumulation but by technological catching
up and imitation. The model will be stylized and simplied in such way that a region can
be modelled with three equations.
2.2.1 Final output
The nal output sector of region i uses human capital Hi and international capital owing
into the region as FDI Fi and domestic real capital Ki to produce a homogeneous nal
good. Hence, in this model the most important factors of production that might eventu-
ally drive the growth process are three di¤erent types of capital. We particularly assume
that domestic capital and international capital are di¤erent. The fundamental di¤erence
and the continued high degree of capital control segregate the market for domestic and
international capital. Workers are assumed to be allocated to any production process at a
subsistence level of income from a pool of surplus labour. As in a Lewis Economy, labour is
not a growth restricting factor. The Lewis turning point has not yet been reached. Hence,
Hi; Ki and Fi can be regarded as the respective capital per unit labour. Based on the small
economy assumption and the integration of regional goods markets into world markets, the
per capita production of the nal good yi can be regarded as Findlays foreign exchange
production function.5 Hence, yi is a production value function measured in international
5See Findlay (1973, 1984).
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prices. With the concept of the foreign exchange production function the aggregate pro-
duction value function stands for a continuum of industries characterized by di¤erent factor
intensities valuated in given international prices. Each level of output value indicates a full
specialisation in the industry characterised by the corresponding factor intensity. A change
in output value and hence factor intensity indicates a switch in specialisation pattern to-
wards another industry. Inowing international capital Fi is fully depreciated during the
period of inux. Production of the nal good takes place under perfect competition and
constant economies of scale. It is described by
yi = AiH

i Fi K1  i ; (2.1)
with Ai = !iA
where Ai indicates the regional level of technology and !i is the regions relative techno-
logical position compared to the technology leader A which increases at a given rate n. As
we will see later, domestic technology will be driven by !i: The domestic product is used
for government expenditures which is the fraction i of output, domestic consumption and
exports.
2.2.2 FDI inow and exports
Optimal capital inow is derived from the rmsoptimal factor demand. Due to the small
country assumption, capital costs in a region for international capital Fi are determined
by the exogenous world market interest factor r6 and an ad valorem factor for region
specic international transaction costs  i.  i may include a risk premium related to the
specic region. Since we are also looking at trade policies we introduce  exi as a transaction
cost parameter for exports.  exi may be an export tari¤ or the equivalent of bureaucratic
transaction costs.  i and  exi are modelled as iceberg costs on exports. As we assume that
returns on international capital investments in a region Fi will be fully repatriated, exports
6The interest factor is one plus interest rate.
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Ex must earn international interest rates and all international transaction costs. On the
rm level Exi(1    exi ) =  irFi. Solving the rmsoptimisation problem7 we obtain the
optimal inux of foreign capital
Fi = (1  
ex
i ) (1  i)
 ir
yi (2.2)
and as a fraction 'i of GDP
'i =
Fi
yi
=
(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
:
To keep things simple, international borrowing or lending beyond FDI is excluded.
Since international capital costs have to be paid by exports, we can determine the export
value necessary to cover international capital costs including all transaction costs
Exi =
 ir
(1   exi )
Fi; Exi
yi
= (1  i): (2.3)
Whereas the export share of GDP is simply determined by the elasticity of production
of foreign capital  and the tax rate i (2.2):
2.2.3 Determining the production level
Including optimal capital inows in the production function leads to the production level8
Yi = !i
1
1 H

1 
i (
(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
)

1 
i K
1  
1 
i : (2.4)
Production is now normalised for the international technology level. Hence, production
is determined by regional factor endowments and the relative technology position of the
region compared to the technological leader !i:
7The rm has to determine optimal factor inputs by maximising prots. Since all capital services have
to be paid in terms of exports, the full capital costs include several components such as government taxes
on output i or transaction costs for exports.
8Y = yA
  1
1  ; see also Appendix A2.1.
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2.2.4 Technology and imitation
The developing region does not create new knowledge but acquires technologies by decoding
and imitating foreign designs from international technology leaders. In the present model
growth through technological imitation and agglomeration is driven by three components:9
1) International knowledge spill-over and positive technological externalities from the
inux of FDI were modelled by Markusen and Venables (1999). Here the e¤ects of these
externalities are included at a macro level of modelling.
2) In order to make spill-over from FDI e¤ective for the host region, technology and
rm-relevant public infrastructure must exist.10
3) As the focus lies on underdeveloped regions, the case of innovations in this backward
region is excluded. The imitation process is a¤ected by the technology gap (1 !) between
the backward region and the industrialised world. If the domestic stock of technology
is low (! is small), it is relatively easy to increase the technology position by adopting
foreign designs. However, the process becomes increasingly di¢ cult as the technology gap
narrows.11 Therefore, in this approach technological progress in a backward economy is
modelled as a process of endogenous catching up relative to an exogenous growth path of
a technology leader.
While the exogenous process is driven by international innovation growth, the endoge-
nous process of imitation and participation in worldwide technical progress is determined
by pure externalities from FDI F(t) and from domestic government investments in the
9There is a broad literature on international technology di¤usion that has suggested various channels.
Eaton and Kortum (2001) discuss trade as a channel of di¤usion in a multi-country setting. See also Coe
and Helpman (1995) who link the direction of technology di¤usion to exports. Keller (1998) however has
some doubts about the link between trade and di¤usion.
10E.g. Martin (1999) has analysed the e¤ects of public policies and infrastructure on the growth perfor-
mance of a regional economy.
11This idea draws back to the well-known Veblen-Gerschenkron hypothesis (Veblen (1915) and Ger-
schenkron (1962)). Later Nelson and Phelps (1966), Gries and Wigger (1993), Gries and Jungblut (1997)
and Gries (2002) further developed these ideas in the context of catching up economies. The catching up
hypothesis has been tested successfully and robustly by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), de la Fuente (2002),
and Engelbrecht (2003).
21
ability to imitate and improve productivity.12
In this aggregate model G(t) stands for the supply of various public goods, and govern-
ment and administrative functions in the economy. In traditional modelling this spending
indicates service necessary to run the institutional arrangements and to make institutions
e¤ective. Therefore, the implicit assumption of such aggregate modelling is that the design
of government institutions and the quality of public governance serves (as a public good)
for the economic e¢ ciency of the private sector. However, recent discussions challenge
this assumption and put emphasis on institutional quality.13 If the design of government
institutions is not meant to serve for the e¢ ciency of markets and the private sector, or
even more, if government institutions are instructed to control and direct micro decisions,
increasing government spending may have negative e¤ects on private economic activities.
In this case the government would provide a negative public good for the private sector
via a poor or even destructive institutional design. This problem may be even more likely
if government institutions in a transformation economy do not have the self-conception of
serving for the e¢ ciency of the economy, and if the government sector acts more in the
tradition of controlling and restricting decentralised private activities. However, even if
we consider this issue in the empirical section, in the theoretical model we assume that
spending on government services generates a positive externality.
Therefore, FDI-driven and government externalities and the resulting relative increase
in domestic technologies by imitation are the elements that allow us to depart from neoclas-
sics. Externalities in the imitation process generate temporary dynamic scale economies.
As scale economies are the driving element in the models introduced by the New Economic
Geography (NEG), there is a link to NEG even if the market structure is not monopolistic
competition. While pure size and pecuniary externalities are permanently positive in NEG
12Note that F(t) and G(t) are normalised values transformed by an international technology index factor
A(t)
1
1  ; and A is growing at a given constant rate n. See also Appendix A2.1.
13Finally, examining the determinants of growth several studies present empirical evidence that there is
also an e¤ect of institutions and the quality of governance on growth (Basu 2006, Barro 1997, Knack and
Keefer 1997a, 1997b, Mauro 1995, Svensson 1998, Chong and Calderon 2000, Hall and Jones 1999, Gradstein
2004 and the series of papers Governance Matters(Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999, 2002 and
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007).
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models, in this approach we focus on the underlying factors of technical externalities from
factors of production and the resulting transitory dynamic scale economies,14
_!i(t) = G(t)
G
i F (t)
F
i   !(t): (2.5)
The externalities from FDI and government infrastructure are assumed to have a rather
limited e¤ect on imitation such that G + F =  < 1 and  is small.
As described above, government expenditures are restricted by government tax income.
We abstract from government borrowing or lending and interregional transfers. Hence, the
government budget constraint is
Gi = iyi: (2.6)
The three equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.5) capture the model of regional development for
one region. The solution to (2.1), (2.2), and (2.5) is a di¤erential equation determining the
growth of the relative stock of technology available to the region (catching up in technology)
during the period of transition to the steady state.15 In this period we observe additional
technological catching up with the steady state productivity growth. As this acceleration
process is driven by additional factors owing into the region, the economy can realise
temporary dynamic scale economies during this catching up and adjustment period. While
_!i(t) is positive during transition, it converges to zero when approaching the steady state
path. Equation (2.7) suggests a decreasing speed of growth with a rising income level as a
result of increasing di¢ culties in the imitation process.16
_!i(t) = 
G
i '

F+

1 

i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!(t)

1 
i   !(t); with
d _!i(t)
d!(t)
< 0: (2.7)
14For the dynamic catching up spill-over equation we assume that G and F are su¢ ciently large for
positive upgrading.
15See Appendix A2.1.
16The dynamic catching up spill-over equation contains a scaling problem if H and K are taken as
absolute values. As the region is assumed to remain backward, the values of ; '; H and K are assumed
to be su¢ ciently small. See Appendix A2.2 for the derivatives.
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Not only the speed of technological catching up _!i(t) is determined by the factor en-
dowments Ki, Hi and the fractions i and 'i: For each endowment we can determine the
steady state position !i of the region. For _!i(t) = 0
17 we obtain
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G
(1 )
(1  )
i '
F (1 )+
(1  )
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  )
; (2.8)
@!i
@Ki
=
(1     )
1      !
K 1i > 0;
@!i
@Hi
=

1     !
H 1i > 0; (2.9)
@!i
@ i
=   (1  )!

i
(1     )

F +

1   

 1i < 0; (2.10)
@!i
@ exi
=   (1  )!

i
(1     )

F +

1   

(1   exi ) 1 < 0; (2.11)
@!i
@i
=
(1  )!i
(1     )

G
 1
i  

F +

1   

(1  i) 1

>
=
<
0: (2.12)
The essential determinants of the speed of convergence and the nal relative convergence
position are the endowment of capital Ki and human capital Hi, technology relevant gov-
ernment expenditure indicated by i and international (and domestic) transaction costs
connected to exports  exi and FDI  i and hence the share of FDI 'i.
The economic story is rather simple. Reducing  i will reduce the costs of international
capital and increase the input of international capital. As more FDI or government invest-
ments enter the region, spill-over and positive externalities will accelerate imitation and
technology convergence and in turn improve the nal relative technology position of the
region. Similarly, with a larger endowment of capital or human capital, capital productiv-
ity will increase such that additional FDI speeds up imitation and the nal position of the
region improves.
Optimal level of government activity: The steady state reaction of !i resulting from
a change in government expenditures is ambiguous and depends on the present state of
government policy. With respect to the potential goal of maximising the regions steady
17We assume that the contribution of FDI to production  as well as the externality e¤ect of FDI on
technology  are su¢ ciently small. This also reects the already mentioned assumption of a rather limited
spill-over e¤ect of FDI on the relative catching up process.
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state position we can determine an optimum tax rate18 and hence an optimum value of
government expenditures for technology related infrastructure
max
i
! ) i =
G
F +

1   + G
 : (2.13)
Therefore, there is a range i < 

i where an increase in  positively a¤ects !

i . Beyond the
optimal value i (for i > 

i ) increasing taxes and increasing government expenditures
reduce !i :
@!
@i
8>>>><>>>>:
> 0 i < 

i underinvestment
= 0 for i = 

i GDP maximising spending
< 0 i > 

i overinvestment
(2.14)
From the discussion of the adjustment and the steady state we can turn to the general
dynamic behaviour of the regions income path over time. At any point in time t0 the
income path can be described by a Taylor approximation
lnY (t0) = lnY (t0) +
Y 0(t0)
Y (t0)
(t  t0) + 1
2
Y 00(t0)y(t0)  Y 0(t0)2
Y (t0)2
(t  t0) : (2.15)
From this path we can derive the general rule of motion which describes the speed of
the process dened by the growth rate.19
 lnY (t0)
t
=
Y 0(t0)
Y (t0)
+
Y 00(t0)y(t0)  Y 0(t0)2
Y (t0)2
(t  t0) + 1
2
::: (2.16)
=
Y 0
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Y 0
Y
2
=
Y 0
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+
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:
18 In Appendix A2.3 we show that the government can maximise the nal development position of the
economy and the speed of growth by choosing an optimal level of government expenditure for public
infrastructure.
19Since

y0
y
2
is rather small we can approximate the process.
25
Using the model specication we obtain equation (2.17) for the development of each
region.20 Equation (2.17) will be transformed into the estimation equation later on.
d lnY (t0)
dt
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
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(2.17)
2.3 GMM and dynamic panel data estimation
For the empirical analysis we suggest applying a panel data analysis and generalised method
of moments (GMM) estimation. We prefer dynamic panel estimators mainly for two rea-
sons.
First, from a theoretical point of view we should assume that a number of individual
factors exist that cannot be captured in the conditioning set Xi, as di¤erent cross-sections
exhibit di¤erent technological or geographical endowments. The dynamic panel procedure
allows controlling for these specic e¤ects whereas a standard OLS estimator assumes that
the intercept capturing the e¤ect of all omitted and not observable variables is the same
for all provinces. This individual e¤ect must be considered to correlate with the included
explanatory variables, hence omission of the individual e¤ect would become part of the
error term, which would lead to a bias in the estimates.
Second, some of the variables in conditioning set Xi must be considered not strictly
exogenous and determined simultaneously with growth. Accounting for these problems,
panel procedures enable a calculation of consistent and e¢ cient estimates.
With regard to the rst point, panel data estimations can take a cross-sections hetero-
geneity explicitly into account by allowing for individual steady state positions (individual
specic e¤ects) using xed e¤ects. In comparison to the standard xed e¤ect estimator,
20To simplify we consider only linear and log linear processes.
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GMM estimation additionally circumvents the bias associated with the inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable as a regressor. Additionally, by combining the time series dimension
with the cross-sectional dimension, the panel data gives a richer set of information to
analyse the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. It reduces the
collinearity among the explanatory variables, increases the degrees of freedom and gives
more variability and e¢ ciency.21
2.3.1 Instrumentation
In the following we point to the problem of bias caused by a correlation between the
regressor X and the error term " and introduce the idea of instrumentation. When X
and " are correlated the basic idea of instrumentation is to nd a variable Z, that highly
correlates with X, but does not correlate with " and therefore with Y .22
More specically, the starting point is a linear regression
y = X + " with var(") = 2I (2.18)
with a correlation between the observable and the error term
plim

1
n
X 0"

6= 0: (2.19)
To circumvent the bias an instrument Z is used that highly correlates with X
plim

1
n
Z 0X

6= 0 (2.20)
but is orthogonal to "
plim

1
n
Z 0"

= 0: (2.21)
21See Gujarati (2003, p.637).
22See Behr (2003).
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The instrumentation is a two-stage procedure, where in a rst step the explanatory
variable X is regressed on the instrument Z
X = Z + ; (2.22)
bX = Zb = Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0X: (2.23)
In a second step the regressed values bX are used as explanatory variables.
y = bX + "; (2.24)
IV = ( bX 0 bX) 1cX 0y: (2.25)
Inserting the regressed values Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0X for bX results in the instrumental variable
(IV) or two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator of  with the projection matrix P =
Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0
IV =
 
(Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0X)0Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0X
 1
(Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0X)0y (2.26)
= (X 0Z(ZZ 0) 1Z 0Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0X) 1X 0Z(ZZ 0) 1Z 0y
= (X 0Z(ZZ 0) 1Z 0X) 1X 0Z(ZZ 0) 1Z 0y = (X 0PX) 1X 0Py:
2.3.2 GMM
In recent years generalised method of moments (GMM) has become very popular, par-
ticularly in growth regressions and other macroeconomic studies where the inclusion of a
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lagged dependent variable leads to an endogeneity problem. Before we discuss some se-
lected dynamic panel estimators based on this method, we introduce the basic concept of
GMM.
Starting with a linear regression of y onX, an important assumption of the least squares
estimator is the orthogonality of the explanatory variables and the error term
E(X 0") = 0: (2.27)
Applying this assumption to the sample leads to
1
n
X 0(y  Xb) = 0: (2.28)
The estimator for  has to satisfy the moment equation, which just represents the basic
equation for the OLS estimator. Thus, it appears that the OLS method can be represented
as an application of the method of moments. So solving the equation results in the OLS
estimator
b = (X 0X) 1X 0y: (2.29)
With respect to this procedure the instrumentation can be expressed as an application
of GMM. Starting with the assumption of orthogonality of the instrumental variable and
the error term
E(Z 0") = 0; (2.30)
and applying it to the sample leads to
1
n
Z 0(y  Xb) = 0: (2.31)
Solving this equation results in the IV estimator
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bIV = (X 0PX) 1X 0Py (2.32)
with P = Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0:
If the number of instrumental variables equals the number of explanatory variables then
generalised least squares (GLS) leads to the familiar instrumental variables estimator23
bIV = (Z 0X) 1Z 0y: (2.33)
2.3.3 Dynamic panel data estimation
Our point of departure is a simple xed e¤ects growth model of the form
yi;t   yi;t 1 = eyi;t 1 + X 0i;t + ui;t (2.34)
for i = 1; :::; N and t = 2; :::; T , where the lagged endogenous variable yi;t 1 is included
as a regressor and X 0i;t is a row vector of explanatory variables. This method allows for
the inclusion of individual e¤ects for each cross-section. Hence uit = i + "it denotes the
disturbance term that is composed of the individual e¤ect i and stochastic white noise
disturbance "it, where
E(i) = 0; E("i;t) = 0; E("i;t; i) = 0 for i = 1; :::; N and t = 2; :::; T: (2.35)
We can now rewrite equation (2.34) and obtain
yi;t = yi;t 1 + X 0i;t + i + "i;t (2.36)
23See Behr (2003).
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whereas  = e + 1. The errors are assumed to be serially uncorrelated
E("i;t; "i;s) = 0 for s 6= t; (2.37)
the individual e¤ect captures the cross-section specic characteristics and might correlate
with the explanatory variables
E(X 0i;t; i) 6= 0: (2.38)
To receive consistent results one has to assume that the error term is orthogonal to all
explanatory variables
E(X 0i;t; "i;t) = 0, (2.39)
E(yi;t 1; "i;t) = 0. (2.40)
At this point a problem arises as the lagged endogenous variable used as a regressor
correlates with the error term
E(yi;t 1"i;t) 6= 0. (2.41)
If this correlation structure is not taken into account and estimation of (2.36) is carried out
by a common least squares estimator, our estimates will be biased and ine¢ cient (Nickell
1981).
Anderson and Hsiao di¤erence estimator:
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest taking di¤erences of the original equation to eliminate
the individual xed e¤ect
yi;t   yi;t 1 = (yi;t 1   yi;t 2) + (X 0i;t  X 0i;t 1) + "i;t   "i;t 1: (2.42)
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This can be simplied in
4yi;t = 4 yi;t 1 +  4X 0i;t +4"i;t (2.43)
where 4 is the rst di¤erence operator.
However, using di¤erences does not eliminate the problematic relationship between
4yi;t 1 and 4"i;t, since yi;t 1 and "i;t are contained in these terms. So a new correla-
tion problem arises that again leads to a coe¢ cient bias as the di¤erence of the lagged
endogenous variable correlates with the new error term
E(4yi;t 1;4"i;t) 6= 0. (2.44)
Starting with the problem of correlation between the regressor and the error term in (2.44),
a bias can be avoided using an instrumental variable Z that strongly correlates with the
explanatory variable 4yi;t 1 in the equation but does not correlate with the error term
4"i;t. Hence, a valid instrument is characterised by the following assumptions
E(4yi;t 1;Z) 6= 0, (2.45)
E(Z;4"i;t) = 0. (2.46)
The structure of the error term contains the periods t and t   1 , so assuming no serial
correlation in the errors, variables from the period t 2 do not correlate with 4"i;t. Ander-
son and Hsiao (1982) recommend using either the lagged level observation (yi;t 2) or the
lagged di¤erence (4yi;t 2) as instruments for the di¤erenced lagged explanatory variable.
Both correlate with the explanatory variable but not with the error term
E(yi;t 2;4"i;t) = 0, (2.47)
E(4yi;t 2;4"i;t) = 0. (2.48)
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For the case of levels as instruments the following (T  2)m matrix is used for estimation
ZAH1i =
266666664
yi;1 0    0
0 yi;2    0
: : : :
0 0    yi;T 1
377777775
: (2.49)
And the following matrix is used for the case of di¤erences as instruments:
ZAH2i =
266666664
yi;2   yi;1 0    0
0 yi;3   yi;2    0
: : : :
0 0    yi;T 2   yi;T 3
377777775
: (2.50)
The matrices result in the following two estimators
bAH = (XPX) 1X 0Py (2.51)
where P = ZAH1(ZAH10ZAH1) 1ZAH10 or P = ZAH2(ZAH20ZAH2) 1ZAH20:
Arellano (1989) shows that in models with an autoregressive exogenous variable in-
struments in levels are better suited. In contrast to the estimator that uses di¤erenced
instruments, the estimator with level instruments has no singularities and much smaller
variances.24
Arellano and Bond di¤erence estimator:
Though the method recommended by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) provides consistent re-
sults, Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the Anderson-Hsiao estimator is not necessarily
e¢ cient since it does not make use of all available moment restrictions. Following Arellano
24See Bond, Hoe­ er and Temple (2001).
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and Bond (1991) all lagged observations should be used as instruments
E(yi;t s;4"i;t) = 0 for s  2 and t = 3; :::; T: (2.52)
The corresponding 1=2(T   1)(T   2) moment condition can be expressed as follows
Zdi =
266666664
yi1 0 0    0    0
0 yi1 yi2    0    0
: : :    :    :
0 0 0    yi1    yiT 2
377777775
: (2.53)
Using the lagged levels dated t 2 and earlier as instruments for the equation in rst dif-
ferences, the estimator provides consistent and e¢ cient parameter estimates. Simulations
by Judson and Owen (1996) and Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest signicant e¢ ciency
gains of the di¤erence GMM estimator relative to that of the Anderson-Hsiao type in the
form of smaller variances of the estimated coe¢ cients.25
Blundell and Bond system estimator:
However, Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that this di¤erence estimator has poor nite
sample properties in terms of bias and imprecision when the lagged levels of the variables are
weak instruments for the equations in rst di¤erences. This is the case when the time series
are persistent or have near unit root properties. They propose using additional instruments
in levels. In a system GMM estimator they combine the regression in di¤erences with the
regression in levels. The regression equation in di¤erences is given by (2.43), the additional
regression equation in levels is
yi;t = yi;t 1 + X 0i;t + i + "i;t; (2.54)
25See Bond, Hoe­ er and Temple (2001).
34
where di¤erences are used as instruments. Blundell and Bond (1998) consider an additional
stationarity assumption
E(4yi;2i) = 0 for i = 1; :::; N . (2.55)
The moment restriction for the regression equation in di¤erences is the same as above.
Indicating that the di¤erences do not correlate with the error term for the regression
equation in levels, the following moment restrictions are used
E(4yi;t 1ui;t) = 0 for i = 1; :::; N and t = 3; :::; T . (2.56)
The following matrix denes the additional 1=2(T   1)(T   2) moment conditions
Z li =
266666664
4yi2 0 0    0    0
0 4yi2 4yi3    0    0
: : :    :    :
0 0 0    4yi2    4yiT 1
377777775
; (2.57)
so that the system estimator uses the following instrument matrix
Zsi =
24 Zdi 0
0 Z li
35 : (2.58)
Using the moment conditions in (2.52) and (2.56), we construct a GMM estimator
that yields consistent and e¢ cient values for the parameters. It combines the equations in
di¤erences with suitably lagged levels as instruments with the set of equations in levels with
suitably lagged rst-di¤erences. Bond, Hoe­ er and Temple (2001) compare the di¤erence
and the system GMM estimator and show that in an estimation of an empirical growth
model, the system GMM estimator yields more reasonable results. Blundell, Bond and
Windmeijer (2000) report similar improvements for a typical growth model with a lagged
dependent variable and additional right-hand-side variables. Furthermore, Monte Carlo
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simulations26 on the nite sample properties of the GMM estimator for dynamic panel data
models demonstrate a signicant improvement in performance of the system estimator to
the regular di¤erence GMM estimator.27
Test for serial correlation and Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:
The consistency of the GMM estimators hinges heavily upon the assumption that
E(4"i;t;4"i;t 2) = 0: (2.59)
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a test for the hypothesis that there is no second-order
serial correlation. The test statistic based on residuals from the rst-di¤erence equation is
m2 =
c4"0 2c4"c4"1=2  N(0; 1); (2.60)
the corresponding null hypothesis is that of no second order serial correlation.
To check the validity of the instruments Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest Sargans test
of over-identifying restrictions. The null hypothesis for this test is that the instruments
are valid in the sense that they are not correlated with the errors in the rst-di¤erenced
equation. The test statistic is computed as
s = 4b"0Z  NP
i=1
Z 0i 4 b"i 4 b"i0Zi 1 Z 0 4 b"  2p K 1 (2.61)
where p is the number of columns in Z and 4b" denotes the residuals from the two-step
estimation.
The Di¤erence Sargan test can be used to test the additional assumptions and the
validity of the additional instruments for the equation in levels.28
26Monte Carlo results on the nite sample properties of the GMM estimator for dynamic panel data
models have been reported, amongst others, by Arellano and Bond (1991), Kiviet (1995), Ziliak (1997),
Blundell and Bond (1998) and Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999).
27See Bond, Hoe­ er and Temple (2001) and Behr (2003).
28For a detailed presentation of the specication tests see Verbeek (2008, pp. 155-157).
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2.4 Specication of the model and data
To analyse the determinants of growth and the convergence process within China, it is
necessary to use regional data to take the regionsheterogeneity into account. Our data
set covers the period 1991-2004 and contains annual data for 28 Chinese provinces, au-
tonomous regions, and municipalities.29 These are Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning,
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang,
Anhui, Jiagxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yun-
nan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. The provinces Tibet and Hainan are
excluded because of missing values. In constructing our data set we use new income and
investment data reported by Hsueh and Li (1999) and various sources of Chinese o¢ cial
statistics provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), namely the China Statisti-
cal Yearbook (CSY) from 1996-2004 and the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004.
Regarding the reliability of Chinas statistics economists and general observers have dif-
ferent views. And although Chinese o¢ cial data are widely used for economic research,
there are still critics who claim that the data may be falsied for political purposes. Re-
cent opinions show a tendency of an enormous improvement of the reliability of data. For
example, Chow (2006) point out that Chinese o¢ cial statistics are by large reliable and
useful for drawing conclusions about the Chinese economy. Rawski (2001) argues that
two decades of reform have produced impressive achievements in the realm of economic
statistics. The range, depth, and quality of statistical documentation surrounding Chinas
economic performance matched or exceeded comparable materials for many nations at sim-
ilar or even higher levels of economic development. However, both authors suggest that
Chinese statistical reporting during the last few years has not been accurate and there is
an overestimation of the o¢ cial GDP statistics. Yet, taking di¤erences of the data, which
29The choice of the period makes sense for two reasons. First, the early 1990s saw the latest wave of
international integration policy in China. Also in the early 1990s the Chinese government started to prepare
for WTO accession and a further opening up of the economy. Second, with respect to some important
indicators some provinces would have had to be excluded if the time period had been expanded to earlier
years.
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is the case in our empirical model, attenuates the possible measuring inaccuracy. In the
following the variables are described in detail.
Our estimation equations are directly derived from the theoretical model presented
above. The general equation of motion for the above model (2.17) translates into the
estimation equations (2.62), (2.63) and (2.64) with the following specication
4yi;t = 1yi;t 1 + 2 4Ki;t + 2 4 POPi;t + 4 4HCi;t (2.62)
+5 4 FDIi;t + 6 4GOV 1i;t + 7 4GOV 2i;t
+8POPKM2i;t + 9URBANi;t +4"i;t
and an alternative version where trade is assumed to have positive technology spill-over
4yi;t = 1yi;t 1 + 2 4Ki;t + 2 4 POPi;t + 4 4HCi;t (2.63)
+5 4 Ti;t + 6 4GOV 1i;t + 7 4GOV 2i;t
+8POPKM2i;t + 9URBANi;t +4"i;t .
To capture the e¤ect of governance and institutional quality on GDP growth in a further
step we extend our specication by an additional explanatory variable. We also note, that
the inclusion of the Marketisation index which is only available for the period 1997-2005,
means that our results are based upon an unbalanced panel. Because VIF values denote a
bigger problem of multicollinearity in the case where the index of Marketisation is included
in specication (2.62), we use the extended version of model specication (2.63)
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4yi;t = 1yi;t 1 + 2 4Ki;t + 2 4 POPi;t + 4 4HCi;t (2.64)
+5 4 Ti;t + 6 4GOV 1i;t + 7 4GOV 2i;t
+8POPKM2i;t + 9URBANi;t + 9 4MARKETi;t +4"i;t
where yi;t denotes GDP per capita, Ki;t denotes provincial capital stock, POPi;t measures
the population, HCi;t is the proxy for human capital, FDIi;t refers to FDI and Ti;t to trade,
GOV 1i;t and GOV 2i;t are the shares of government expenditure in GDP, POPKM2i;t is
the proxy for aggregation, URBANi;t the proxy for urbanization and MARKETi;t repre-
sents the NERI index of Marketisation. Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of all
variables. The notation of the estimation equation translates as follows:
Real GDP per capita - yi;t :
yi;t denotes the log of real GDP per labour unit and yi;t gives growth rate yt   yt 1 over
time period t  (t 1). We obtained provincial level output data from Hsueh and Li (1999)
covering the period 1978-1995 and from various issues of the Statistical Yearbook of China
for 1996-2004. GDP expressed in current prices (Yuan) has been deated with 1995 as
the base year. The number of employed persons is taken from the China Compendium of
Statistics 1949-2004.
Real capital stock - Ki;t :
Ki;t denotes the log of real capital stock per unit labour in each province i. The real
physical capital stock for all provinces is estimated using the standard perpetual inventory
approach. It is accumulated according to
Ki;t+1 = Ii;t + (1  )Ki;t (2.65)
where Ki;t and Ki;t+1 is the capital stock of year t and t+ 1, Ii;t denotes investment, and
 the depreciation rate. The investment series used is gross xed capital formation and is
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taken at current prices, it is obtained from Hsueh and Li (1999) and the Chinese Statistical
Yearbooks. We assume that the depreciation rate  is 5 per cent for all provinces as in
Miyamoto and Liu (2005). For the initial capital stocks for each province we use the average
ratio of provincial GDP to national GDP for each province over the period 1952-1977 as
the weight. Following Wang and Yao (2003) we assume their estimate of 26,609.67 billion
Yuan as the initial real capital stock for 1977 at the national level. By multiplying this
initial capital stock with the provincial weights we derive the initial capital stock for each
province. To calculate the real capital stock we use a new investment deator provided
by Hsueh and Li (1999) for the period 1978-1995 combined with the price index for xed
asset investment for the period 1996-2004. Again we use the number of employed persons
to calculate the real capital stock per labour unit.
Population - POPi;t :
POPi;t denotes the population in a province. The population data is obtained from the
China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004.
Human capital - Hi;t :
Enrolment in higher education as log of the share in the total employed population is the
proxy for human capital Hi;t. According to the Ministry of Education of the Peoples
Republic of China, higher education in China has played a signicant part in economic
growth, scientic progress and social development in the country "by bringing up large
scale of advanced talents and experts for the construction of socialist modernisation." This
is also conrmed by our results when we use enrolment in secondary school instead of higher
education. In this case the coe¢ cient of human capital is not signicant. We obtained the
data from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004.30
30Barro and Lee (2001) argue that enrolment rates do not adequately measure the aggregate stock of
human capital available contemporaneously as an input to production and alternatively average years of
schooling should be used. However, a multiplicity of empirical studies uses enrolment rates with plausible
results supporting the validity of this variable. Since data on average years of schooling is available only on
country and not on provincial level we decide to use enrolment rates as a proxy for human capital.
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FDI - FDIi;t :
We use the log of foreign direct investment per employee as a measure for economic in-
tegration. Because FDI data is available only in Yuan, we transform the data into US
Dollars using the national exchange rate for each year reported by the National Bureau of
Statistics.
Trade - Ti;t :
The second variable measuring economic integration is trade. It is the log of the sum of
imports and exports taken from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004 divided
by the number of employed persons.
Government spending - GOV 1i;t; GOV 2i;t :
Two variables can indicate the e¤ect of government expenditure on economic growth. The
rst is local government general expenditure on administration (GOV 1i;t) and the second
is local government general expenditure in culture, education, science and public health
(GOV 2i;t), both as a share of GDP. Again, the source of the data is the China Compendium
of Statistics 1949-2004.
Agglomeration - POPKM2i;t :
Agglomeration is not formally modelled in the above theoretical model. However, models
introduced by New Economic Geography (NEG) emphasise the relevance of agglomera-
tion for growth.31 Population density, measured as the provincial population per square
kilometre is used as a proxy for the degree of agglomeration in a province. The data are
obtained from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004.
Urbanisation - URBANi;t :
Urbanisation is the second variable addressing the hypothesis of positive agglomeration
e¤ects on growth from NEG. Urbanisation is measured by the ratio of the urban employed
31The empirical literature on the New Economic Geography suggests many variables which could function
as a proxy for agglomeration. We concentrate on population density and the share of urbanisation. Those
measures are widely used and valid proxies for agglomeration (see Büttner, Schwager and Stegarescu 2004,
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller 2004, Brüllhart and Sbergarmi 2009).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
4yi;t 364 0.0359 0.0622 -0.1621 0.2181
yi;t 1 364 9.0246 0.5205 7.8907 10.4600
4Ki;t 364 0.1017 0.0375 -0.0667 0.3012
4POPi;t 364 0.0094 0.0086 -0.0197 0.1062
4HCi;t 364 0.1293 0.1033 -0.2676 0.6027
4FDIi;t 364 0.2641 0.5691 -1.6910 3.0636
4Ti;t 364 0.1769 0.2068 -0.5755 0.7759
4GOV 1i;t 364 0.0157 0.1015 -0.4567 0.4963
4GOV 2i;t 361 0.0024 0.0505 -0.2993 0.2805
POPKM2i;t 392 359.3168 416.1426 6.5136 2253.983
URBANi;t 383 0.3358 0.1700 0.1190 0.7993
4MARKETi;t 196 0.0650 0.0674 -0.0975 0.2959
population to the total population. The data were sourced from the China Compendium
of Statistics 1949-2004.
Quality of governance and institutions - MARKETi;t :
To capture the e¤ect of good governance and institutions, we use the NERI index of
Marketisation for Chinas Provinces, newly published by the National Economic Research
Institute (NERI) (Fan, Wang and Zhu 2007). This index measures ve levels of institutional
development using 23 indicators of institutional environments. Each indicator is valued by
a score between zero and ten, with 2001 as the base year. A larger score indicates a higher
level of institutional development. The ve elds of the index are: 1. government-market
relations, 2. the development of the non-state enterprise sectors, 3. the development of
commodity markets, 4. the development of factor markets and 5. the development of
market intermediaries and the legal framework (Wang, Fan and Zhu 2008).
2.5 Estimation results
The results of the estimates are summarised in Table 2.2, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. Table
2.2 shows the results for the Arellano and Bond di¤erence estimator reported as GMM-
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Table 2.2: GMM growth regressions with FDI (1991-2004)
Dependent variable: 4yi;t
GMM-DIFF GMM-SYS
coe¤. Std. Err. coe¤. Std. Err.
yi;t 1 -0.186*** (0.099) -0.117*** (0.000)
4Ki;t 1.066*** (0.359) 0.744** (0.302)
4POPi;t 0.832 (1.443) -0.019 (1.375)
4HCi;t 0.377*** (0.100) 0.376*** (0.120)
4FDIi;t 0.029** (0.012) 0.030** (0.014)
4GOV 1i;t -0.029 (0.072) -0.148 (0.147)
4GOV 2i;t -0.311*** (0.100) -0.244** (0.123)
POPKM2 -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
URBAN -0.438 (0.294) -0.146 (0.411)
m1 0.005 0.001
m2 0.982 0.853
Sargan 0.524 0.275
Obs 299 327
Note: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
DIFF and the Blundell and Bond system estimator denoted as GMM-SYS for the period
1991-2004. The estimates are based on the specied model in (2.62).32
Table 2.3 accordingly presents the results of the alternative specication in (2.63). We
avoid including both FDI and trade in one model because of multicollinearity problems.33
Finally, Table 2.4 shows the results of the model specication in (2.64). To verify GMM
consistency, we have to make sure that the instruments are valid. We use the Sargan test
of over-identifying restrictions to test the validity of the instrumental variables which is a
general specication test. The null hypothesis assumes that the orthogonality conditions
32We calculate also the OLS and the FE estimates of the three models with FDI and trade. These
are presented in Table A2.3. The results are largely consistent with the GMM results concerning the
signs and the signicance levels. In contrast to the dynamic estimation technique in the rst and second
model only the human capital coe¢ cients shows a negative signicant e¤ect. Possible explanations for
these di¤erences are the omitted province specic e¤ects, so we concentrate our interpretation on the
GMM results. Additionally, we use the Hausman test to check for unobserved heterogeneity between the
provinces. If the null hypothesis is signicant, a simple OLS estimator is consistent and e¢ cient, whereas
the GMM estimator is consistent in all cases. For our model the null hypothesis is rejected so that the
GMM estimation should be favoured.
33We also checked for multicollinearity of all other variables. Table A2.1 presents the correlation matrix
of the variables and Table A2.2 shows the VIFs for all three models.
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Table 2.3: GMM growth regressions with trade (1991-2004)
Dependent variable: 4yi;t
GMM-DIFF GMM-SYS
coe¤. Std. Err. coe¤. Std. Err.
yi;t 1 -0.221*** (0.099) -0.181*** (0.000)
4Ki;t 0.958*** (0.172) 0.746*** (0.143)
4POPi;t 0.754 (1.110) 0.781 (1.148)
4HCi;t 0.239** (0.105) 0.300*** (0.095)
4Ti;t 0.066*** (0.023) 0.048** (0.019)
4GOV 1i;t -0.045 (0.095) -0.172** (0.078)
4GOV 2i;t -0.185 (0.117) -0.141 (0.130)
POPKM2 -0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
URBAN 0.268 (0.375) 0.409 (0.312)
m1 0.005 0.002
m2 0.982 0.896
Sargan 0.524 0.440
Obs 299 327
Note: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
of the instrumental variables are satised. In the case of the di¤erence estimator the test
indicates that the instruments appropriately do not correlate with the error term. The
validity of lagged levels combined with lagged rst di¤erences is lower in both models
while the p-values remain satisfactory.
Looking at Tables 2.2 and 2.3, most explanatory variables enter with the sign predicted
from the model, except government expenditures and the proxies for agglomerations and
urbanisation. Hence, the major ndings of the estimates suggest that there are two sources
for the Chinese growth process: external sources available due to international integration,
and domestic sources:
1. Development and international integration
 Controlling for other explanatory variables the coe¢ cient for lagged GDP per
capita is negative and signicant. This result indicates a non-stationary process.
Some sort of non-linear catching up or adjustment process seems to be char-
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Table 2.4: GMM growth regressions with Marketisation (1991-2004)
Dependent variable: 4yi;t
GMM-DIFF GMM-SYS
coe¤. Std. Err. coe¤. Std. Err.
yi;t 1 -0.273** (0.124) -0.040** (0.021)
4Ki;t 0.921*** (0.143) 0.689*** (0.167)
4POPi;t 0.462 (0.345) -0.090 (0.559)
4HCi;t 0.055* (0.035) 0.137** (0.055)
4Ti;t 0.039* (0.020) 0.042* (0.024)
4GOV 1i;t -0.005 (0.033) -0.038 (0.050)
4GOV 2i;t -0.078 (0.048) -0.130* (0.071)
POPKM2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
URBAN 0.149** (0.071) 0.094** (0.043)
4MARKET 0.088** (0.040) 0.141*** (0.043)
m1 0.041 0.015
m2 0.010 0.085
Sargan 0.997 1.000
Obs 166 194
Note: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
acteristic for Chinas provinces. In other words, on the conditioning set of
all other explanatory variables initially poorer provinces tend to have higher
growth rates.34 This nding is predicted by the model above. During the pe-
riod of rapid catching up and non-stationary growth and non-linear temporary
dynamic scale economies are additional driving forces of development. In the
model this process is driven by technological imitation and spill-overs originally
entering China through international integration.
 Trade is highly signicant and shows a positive e¤ect on growth. Learning to
produce for the international market seems to be an important growth driving
mechanism through international integration.
34To get a better impression of the relationship between growth and the lagged GDP per capita, we plot
these variables for the whole panel as well as for each province. All scatter plots suggest a negative linear
relationship between these variables which is consistent with our results. Additionally, we run a simple
regression in logs to investigate a non-linear relationship however the results fell o¤ in quality with regard
to the signicance level of the linear regression which is again an indication for a linear relationship. The
results are available upon request.
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 In the alternative model where Foreign Direct Investment is included instead
of trade, we likewise see a positive signicant e¤ect at the 5% level. This re-
sult supports the underlying theory that FDI may create technology spill-over
through imitation. At least part of the technological catching up process may be
driven by international integration via FDI. In the theoretical model above FDI
and exports are two sides of the same coin. However, introducing marketisation
as a proxy for market oriented institutional arrangements and governance the
picture becomes more complex. As FDI and marketisation are highly collinear,
the sole technology spill-over from FDI does not seem to be the full story (see
the discussion of marketisation below).
2. Domestic sources of development
 The coe¢ cient for physical capital is signicant and shows the strongest positive
impact on output growth in absolute terms for both the GMM-DIFF and the
GMM-SYS independent of whether FDI or trade are included in the model. This
result indicates that the growth process in China is not only a phenomenon
caused by foreign rms investing in a poor country. The growth process has
strong and important domestic components. However, while the theoretical
model does not address the origin of domestic capital in each province, this
question seems crucial. If provincial real capital is accumulated via savings in
each province there is no inter-provincial growth conict. If the source of capital
in successful provinces is an inter-provincial capital ow, these provinces may
grow at the expense of other provinces. In this case, inter-provincial capital
ows may be a source of growth but also of divergence.
 Human capital (measured in higher education enrolment) contributes positively
and is highly signicant. As expected this result suggests that better education
at the higher level improves the process of industrialisation. Qualied workers
with intermediate skill level have the ability to work in production plants with
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high productivity. Hence, increasing human capital per capita a¤ects economic
output in the sense that it leads to higher productivity.
 In both models (GMM-DIFF and the GMM-SYS ) in Table 2.4 the coe¢ cients
of the marketisation proxy show positive signicant e¤ects on growth support-
ing the literature. The results suggest that good governance in a province is
inextricably linked to its competitiveness and that the quality of institutions
has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. High collinearity of marketisation
with FDI suggests that FDI are attracted by marketisation and a bundle of
components consisting of good institutional conditions, FDI and the expansion
of the domestic private sector drives growth.
3. No signicant sources of development
 In all cases population shows an insignicant e¤ect.35 Following the ideas of
surplus labour introduced by Lewis (1954) this result is not surprising as long
as China has not reached the Lewis turning point. In other words, as long as
pure labour is not a growth restricting factor, China still seems to have a surplus
of labour in the rural sector that can be added to the growth restricting factors
as needed. Pure labour can be added to or withdrawn from a region without
a¤ecting output.
 The coe¢ cient for government administration expenditure and the expenditures
in culture, education, science and public health shows, if anything, a signicant
negative impact on growth. With respect to the theoretical model this result
suggests that we have an ine¢ cient investment in this kind of government ac-
tivities. From the theory and discussion above we know there are two potential
explanations for this result: 1. Bad quality of governance and institutions may
lead to a government spending as negative public good. That is, government
35Using employees instead of population leads to insignicant results as well.
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arrangements and institutions do not promote the private sector, but deterio-
rate productivity growth. 2. Even if provincial governments may cause positive
e¤ects (government activities really decrease international transaction costs or
help to improve technology spill-over from international technologies), if at the
same time taxes become too high, potential positive e¤ects are over-compensated
and the nanced government activities must be regarded as over-investment.
Our ndings suggest that there is an over-investment in certain elds of govern-
ment spending. Government expenditure needs to be adjusted and optimised
to drive the growth process more e¢ ciently.
 Agglomeration can be measured by the degree of urbanisation. However, as for
density, urbanisation measured as the ratio of the employed urban population
to total population has no signicant e¤ect on growth in the estimations in
Tables 2.2 and 2.3. These results suggest that agglomerations do not seem to
generate the growth driving positive externalities sometimes proposed.36 The
result is also supported by the coe¢ cient for population density. However, when
marketisation is included, urbanisation becomes highly signicant suggesting
that agglomerations are an own ingredient for growth. We believe that this
change may be due to the very broad construction of the marketisation index
having many interactions with other variables.
To sum up the empirical ndings: We show that based on the theoretical model all
three kinds of capital, namely domestic physical capital, human capital and foreign capital,
enter positively and signicantly. To a large extent, these factors are responsible for the
development of Chinas provinces and hence of China as a whole. With regard to the
tremendous success story of the coastal belt during the sample period the hypothesis that
international integration has had an enormous e¤ect is supported by the positive e¤ect of
36To account for a possible non-linear e¤ect of urbanisation on growth we run additional regressions
with an additional quadratic term of urbanisation. However, the results for the original and the quadratic
variable are not signicant.
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FDI and trade. However, we also identify a group of variables that has no or even a negative
e¤ect on growth - these include population, government expenditure and the proxies for
agglomeration and urbanisation. These two surprising results contradict the NEG. They
propose that pure agglomeration and urbanisation do not favour economic growth, and they
emphasise the importance of fundamental production factors such as domestic, foreign and
human capital. Since we included these factors in our analysis, there is no additional e¤ect
that could come from pure agglomeration or urbanisation. Finally, we identify a positive
signicant coe¢ cient of marketisation indicating that good governance exhibit a benecial
e¤ect on the development process.
2.6 Summary and conclusion
In the last decade the Peoples Republic of China experienced a very impressive devel-
opment. However, the country is characterised by increasing inequality. To ensure that
Chinas successful development can be maintained, it seems important to identify the de-
terminants of provincial success.
To address this question we introduce a stylised model of regional development. Growth
and development is driven by two sources. 1. International integration indicated by FDI
and trade promotes imitation from international technologies and leads to a technological
upgrading of a region. 2. The domestic capital endowment in terms of real and human
capital and government investments into growth relevant infrastructure represent domestic
sources of growth.
Using panel data analysis and GMM estimation, our empirical analysis supports the
predictions of our theoretical model of growth. International integration indicated by for-
eign direct investment and trade is signicant and shows the predicted positive e¤ects on
growth. This result supports the underlying theory that these factors create technology
spill-over e¤ects and promote productivity growth. Controlling for other explanatory vari-
ables we nd a non-stationary and non-linear adjustment process across Chinas provinces,
which suggests that poorer provinces are catching up. The domestic capital endowment
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in terms of real and human capital enters with the expected positive signs, verifying the
importance of these production factors and suggesting that a better educated population
a¤ects economic output through higher productivity.
However, other factors also expected to contribute positively to development such as
government expenditure and labour, do not promote growth. According to the theory the
negative e¤ect of government expenditure can be regarded as bad quality of institutions
or an over-investment in certain elds of government activities. The insignicant labour
e¤ect supports Lewisidea of surplus labour, and suggests that China has not yet reached
the Lewis turning point.
According to NEG, agglomerations and urbanisation are factors driving growth. Al-
though not included in the theoretical model, we approximate these factors to examine
their importance. However, the results of these two variables are not stable in the di¤erent
models. Finally, when extending the model by a proxy for the quality of governance and
institutions using an unbalanced panel we identify a positive e¤ect of good governance and
institutions on the development process.
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Chapter 3
Chinas provincial disparities and the
determinants of provincial inequality
This chapter results from the paper Chinas provincial disparities and the determinants
of provincial inequality by Gries, T. and Redlin, M. published in the Journal of Chinese
Economic and Business Studies in 2009.
3.1 Introduction
Regional disparity1 is a clearly identied problem in Chinas development. In the current
period of increasing regional disparity, which began in the late 1970s,2 various determi-
nants of increasing provincial inequality3 have been discussed. With the economic reforms
and the Open Door Policyintroduced about three decades ago, preferential policy4 and
geographic advantages of the coastal region5 reduced international transaction costs for ex-
ports and international investors.6 For the period 1978 to 1993 Chen and Fleisher (1996)
found evidence of regional convergence conditional e.g. on coastal location and FDI. How-
1Milanovic (2005) distinguishes two di¤erent concepts of regional inequality. The rst considers the
disparity of regional income averages, while the second refers to the issue of overall income inequality
among citizens within a nation.
2Kanbur and Zhang (2005) identied a structural break in their time series data in 1979.
3Analysing the economic development of the coast, the interior and the rural and urban provinces Kanbur
and Zhang (2005), Huang, Kuo and Kao (2003), Li and Zhao (1999) and Wan (1998) nd statistical evidence
of increasing provincial disparities. A major nding in the literature is that inequality measured e.g. by
sigma convergence has increased in past decades (Chen and Fleisher 1996, Jian, Sachs and Warner 1996,
Zhang, Liu and Yao 2001, Wang 2003 and Yao and Zhang 2001b).
4See Démurger et al. (2002).
5Bao et al. (2002) point out that geography, translating into international transaction costs, is respon-
sible for a signicant part of the success story.
6See Wei (2000).
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ever, disparities between coastal areas and the hinterland seemed to increase.7 Since 1992
the experiment of trade and FDI facilitating deregulation has been extended to other loca-
tions. Again, the most important of the now privileged regions are located along the coast.
International integration seems to be a major determinant of successful development and
a driving force of regional disparity.8 "Export and FDI have been causing the Chinese
economy to grow faster, while at the same time the highly uneven distribution of trade
and FDI has caused regional disparity to increase greatly" (Fujita and Hu, 2001, p. 31).
While this view is widespread, few papers directly address the determinants of dispar-
ity. Tsui (2007) examines ve decades of provincial development, ending 1999. Using a
decomposition method the provincial GDP per capita growth di¤erential is decomposed
into contributions by total factor productivity (TFP) and other factor inputs. The increase
in inequality from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s is due to the contribution of TFP which
dominates that of physical capital. The opposite is true for the 1980s. The increase in the
1990s is mainly driven by the distribution of investments in favour of the coastal provinces
and is reinforced by the contribution of TFP. The other study that methodologically and
explicitly addresses disparity is Wan, Lu and Chen (2007). It discusses Chinas process
of international integration. Among other things, the income generating estimation in-
corporates trade and FDI variables. Using these estimation results the authors apply the
Shapley value decomposition technique to quantify the contributions of globalisation to
regional disparity. They nd that internationalisation, domestic capital and reforms con-
tribute substantially to regional inequality. Other, much smaller contributions come from
education, location and urbanisation.
In this paper we pick up the idea of directly addressing the phenomenon of disparity.
We suggest a direct explanation of provincial disparity measured by the per capita income
Theil index. Therefore, in our estimation we directly relate income disparity (indicated by
7See also Wen (2003) who found industrial clustering and a high geographic concentration of industries
in several coastal regions. Cumulative causation in this process of industrial concentration is emphasised
by Golley (2002).
8Wang and Ge (2004) discover that the regional disparities between the eastern region and the rest of
China are widening, while regional disparity between central and western China is shrinking.
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the contribution to the per capita income Theil index) to the disparity of selected income
determining factors (indicated by the contribution to every other Theil index of the de-
terminants). In other words, we estimate whether the disparity (Theil index contribution)
of an income determining provincial variable positively or negatively contributes to the
disparity of per capita income measured by the Theil index.
To obtain a general impression of disparity in China and the provincial contribution to
this inequality, we calculate the Theil index and focus on the composition of this index.
As a rst step we show the development of the total Theil index and the contributions of
the most important provinces to disparity.
The Theil index is dened as
T =
1
n
nX
i=1
(
xi
x
ln
xi
x
); (3.1)
where xi is the GDP per capita of province i, x is the mean income, and n is the number
of provinces. Figure 31 presents the results for the post-reform period from 1978 to 2004.
Starting with a value of 0.19 in 1978 the Theil index fell below 0.15 in 1990. At this point
the picture changed, inequality increased consistently and reached 0.17 in 2004. Hence, the
post-reform period can be divided into two sub-periods: 1) the period from 1978 to 1990
where inequality decreased, and 2) the period since 1990 where inequality has increased.
Furthermore, the overall Theil index is broken down by the provincescontributions which
are dened as
Ti =
1
n
(
xi
x
ln
xi
x
): (3.2)
The composition reveals that not all provinces contribute to the countrys inequality
to the same degree. In Figure 31 we present only the seven provinces with the highest
contribution to the Theil index, as all other provinces have a contribution that is lower
than 0.02 or even negative.
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Figure 31: Chinas Theil index and its provincial contributions
Figure 32 presents a map with the provincial contribution to the Theil index for 2004.
Especially the eastern provinces, and here in particular Shanghai, strongly inate the Theil
index to a high degree, while the central and western provinces have only a minor impact.
This indicates that inter-provincial inequality in China is driven mainly by a few prosperous
provinces.
This picture is conrmed if we analyse the inequality contribution of Chinas eastern,
central and western regions.9 We decompose the Theil index accounting for the weighted
average of inequality within the three regions, plus inequality between these regions. The
decomposed Theil index is dened as
T =
mX
k=1
skTk +
mX
k=1
sk ln
xk
x
; (3.3)
9The provinces Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong,
Guangdong and Guangxi are referred as eastern provinces. Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiagxi,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Inner Mongolia belong to the central region. Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi,
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang are the western provinces. See also Figure A1.1.
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Figure 32: Provincial Theil index contribution (2004)
55
where the country is divided in m regions and sk is the income share of region k, Tk is
the Theil index for that region, and xk is the average income in region k.
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Figure 33: Decomposition of Chinas Theil index
Figure 33 presents the decomposition of the regional Theil index. The three regions
do not contribute to the countrys inequality to the same degree. The inequality within
the western region and the central region has only a slight impact. In particular, the
inequality within the eastern region and between the three regions is what drives the Theil
index.10 In other words, the disparity between east, central and west, and also to a large
extent the disparity between the eastern provinces (within east) is most important. Again,
provincial disparity measured by the Theil index is a phenomenon caused by a handful of
rich provinces. Inequality is mainly caused by the rich eastern provinces, in particular by
the within e¤ect of the eastern provinces.
10Figures A31, A32 and A33 in the Appendix show the regional Theil indices for the eastern, central
and western provinces with the provincial contribution. The Theil index of the eastern region reveals much
higher inequality than in the central and western region.
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Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to explain provincial disparity in China.
The focus is not on the income and growth process itself; rather, the process leading to
disparity is the phenomenon the paper seeks to understand. As a theoretical approach we
introduce a two-region model of development where a change in international transaction
costs will trigger disparity accelerating growth with two mutually dependent processes.
First, additional trade or FDI and positive externalities in one province will accelerate
relative technological growth in that province. Second, there is arbitrage of domestic capital
towards the faster growing province. As an inow of domestic capital and faster imitation
and growth of technologies are mutually favourable, an agglomerating process is initiated.
International and inter-regional factor mobility reinforces disparity. They are positive in
one province and negative in the other. Local policies not only a¤ect the province itself.
Factor mobility, both international and interprovincial, will clearly have additional e¤ects
on all provinces and on provincial disparity. Generally, disparities in provincial income are
caused by disparities in income determining factors.
While in the standard income and growth regression only the existence of a slope be-
tween the dependent and independent variable is important, explaining disparity requires
additional information. As disparity measured in distances is the aim, the distance from
the mean must be included in the measurement concept. The Theil concept fulls this
requirement. The decomposition of the overall Theil index which identies the share at-
tributable to the between-region component becomes a helpful tool for the analysis of
regional inequality as it suggests the relative importance of spatial dimension of inequality
(Novotny 2007). Therefore, we suggest a direct explanation of provincial disparity mea-
sured by the per capita income Theil index. In our estimation we directly relate income
disparity (indicated by the contribution to the per capita income Theil index) to the dis-
parity of selected income determining factors (indicated by the contribution to every other
Theil index of the determinants). In other words, we estimate whether the disparity (Theil
index contribution) of an income determining provincial variable positively or negatively
contributes to the disparity of per capita income measured by the Theil index. We apply
57
a xed e¤ects panel estimation to identify the determinants of inequality for 28 Chinese
provinces over the period 1991-2004.
3.2 A model of provincial development and disparity
In a developing region, international spill-over and externalities through FDI and trade
and infrastructure are relevant determinants of growth and development.11 Taking these
externalities and international spill-over as the starting point, we develop, in e¤ect, a
neoclassical model of growth for a single backward province. Externalities will lead to tem-
porary dynamic scale economies and drive the technical imitation process. The dynamics
of the model are not driven by accumulation but by technological catching up and imita-
tion. The model is taken from Gries and Redlin (2011)12 and is stylised and simplied in
such a way that a province can be modelled with three equations.
3.2.1 Final output
Final output of a province i uses human capital Hi; international capital owing into the
province as FDI Fi and domestic real capital Ki to produce a homogeneous nal good.
Domestic capital and international capital are supposed to be di¤erent. As in a Lewis
Economy, labour is not a growth restricting factor, and the Lewis turning point has not
yet been reached. Hence, Hi; Ki and Fi can be regarded as the respective capital per
unit of labour. Based on the small economy assumption and the integration of provincial
nal product markets into world markets, the per capita production of the nal good yi
can be dened as Findlays foreign exchange production function.13 yi is a production
value function measured in international prices. Each value of output indicates a full
specialisation in the industry characterised by the corresponding factor intensity. Inowing
international capital Fi is fully depreciated during the period of inux. Production of the
11See e.g. Fujita and Thisse (2002, ch. 11), or Kelly and Hageman (1999).
12See Chapter 2.2.
13See Findlay (1973, 1984).
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nal product takes place under constant economies of scale and perfect competition and is
described by
yi = AiH

i Fi K1  i ; (3.4)
with Ai = !iA:
In (3.4) Ai measures the level of technology in province i; and !i is the provinces
relative technological position compared to the technology leader A which increases at
a given rate n. The domestic output is used for domestic consumption, exports, and
government expenditures which is the fraction i of GDP.
3.2.2 FDI inow and exports
Optimal capital inows are determined by the rms optimal factor demand. Due to
the small economy assumption, capital costs of international capital are determined by
an exogenous world market interest factor r and an ad valorem factor for international
transaction costs  i which is specic to each province.  exi is a transaction cost parameter
for exports.  i and  exi are modelled as iceberg costs on exports. Returns on international
capital investments in a province will be fully repatriated, while exports Exi must earn
international interest rates and all international transaction costs. On the rm or provincial
level each province needs to export a corresponding value to cover international capital costs
connected to the provinces FDI ExFi (1    exi ) =  irFi. Solving the rmsoptimisation
problem14 we obtain the required inux of foreign capital
Fi = (1  
ex
i ) (1  i)
 ir
yi (3.5)
and as a fraction 'i of GDP
'i =
Fi
yi
=
(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
:
14The rm has to determine optimal factor inputs by maximising prots.
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To simplify, international borrowing or lending beyond FDI is excluded. We also as-
sume that foreign exchange reserves are not transferred between provinces. Therefore,
international capital costs have to be covered by provincial exports. Additional exports
are required to nance imports of the province. Imports for consumption purposes are
determined by a standard household decision problem.15
Exi
yi
= "i = (1  ) [1  (1   exi )] (1  i) (3.6)
whereas the export share of GDP is simply determined by the elasticity of production
of foreign capital  and the tax rate i (3.5): Including optimal capital inows in the
production function leads to the production level
Yi = !i
1
1 H

1 
i (
(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
)

1 
i K
1  
1 
i ; Yi =
yi
A
1
1 
: (3.7)
As we do not intend to consider scale e¤ects from technological leaders, production is
now normalised for the international technology level.16 Therefore, production is deter-
mined by provincial factor endowments and the relative technology position of the province
compared with the technological leader !i:
3.2.3 Technology and imitation
The developing province acquires technologies by imitating foreign designs from interna-
tional technology leaders. International knowledge spill-over and positive technological
externalities from the inux of FDI are included at a macro level of modelling. In order
to make spill-over from FDI e¤ective for the host province, a technology and rm-relevant
public infrastructure must exist. As the focus lies on underdeveloped provinces the case
15The households decision problem is described as:
max : U = C Im1 ;
s:t: : 0 = y (1  i)   irFi   Ci   pi(1  exi ) Imi
For the solution see Appendix A3.2.
16Yi = yiA
 1=(1 ); see also Appendix A3.1.
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of innovations in this backward province is excluded. The imitation process is a¤ected by
the technology gap (1   !) between the backward province and the industrialised world.
If the domestic stock of technology is low (! is small), it is relatively easy to improve
the technology by imitating foreign designs. However, the process becomes increasingly
di¢ cult as the technology gap narrows.
The endogenous process of imitation and participation in worldwide technical progress is
determined by pure externalities from FDI or trade indicated by exports and from domestic
government investments in the ability to imitate and improve productivity.17 Externalities
in the imitation process generate temporary dynamic scale economies. We focus on the
technical externalities from factors of production and the resulting transitory dynamic scale
economies18
_!i(t) = G(t)
G
i F (t)
F
i Ex(t)
Ex
i   !(t): (3.8)
The externalities from FDI F (t) or exports Ex(t); and government infrastructure G(t) are
assumed to have a rather limited e¤ect on imitation such that G + F + Ex =  < 1 and
 is small.
As we abstract from government borrowing or lending and interprovincial transfers,
government expenditures are restricted by tax income. Therefore, the government budget
constraint is
Gi = iyi; Exi = "iyi: (3.9)
Equations (3.4), (3.5), and (3.8) capture the model of provincial development for one
province. The solution to equations (3.4), (3.5), and (3.8) is a di¤erential equation deter-
mining the growth of the relative stock of technology available to the province (catching
17As we would like to exclude pure scale e¤ects from technical progress of the technical leader F (t)i and
G(t)i and Exi are normalised values transformed by an international technology index factor A(t)1=(1 );
and A is growing at a given constant rate n. See also Appendix A3.1.
18For the dynamic catching up spill-over equation we assume that G and F and Ex are su¢ ciently large
for positive upgrading.
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up in technology) during the period of transition to the steady state.19 The economy can
realise temporary dynamic scale economies during this catching up and adjustment period.
While _!i(t) is positive during transition, it converges to zero when approaching the steady
state path. Equation (3.10) suggests a decreasing speed of growth with a rising income
level as a result of increasing di¢ culties in the imitation process20
_!i(t) = 
G
i '

F+

1 

i "
G
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!(t)

1 
i   !(t); with
d _!i(t)
d!(t)
< 0: (3.10)
Not only the speed of technological catching up _!i(t) is determined by the factor en-
dowments Ki, Hi and the fractions i and 'i: For each endowment we can determine the
steady state position !i of the province. For _!i(t) = 0
21 we obtain
! = 
G
(1 )
(1  )
i '
F (1 )+
(1  )
i "
G
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  )
(3.11)
with 	i : = 
G
i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1  
"Exi : (3.12)
@!i
@Ki
=
(1     )
1      !
K 1i > 0;
@!i
@Hi
=

1     !
H 1i > 0; (3.13)
@!i
@ i
=   (1  )!

i
(1     )

F +

1   

 1i < 0; FDI e¤ect (3.14)
@!i
@ exi
=   (1  )!

i
(1     )

F +

1   

(1   exi ) 1 < 0; trade e¤ect (3.15)
@!i
@i
=
(1  )!i
(1     )

G
 1
i  

F +

1   

(1  i) 1

>
=
<
0: (3.16)
The essential determinants of the speed of convergence and the nal relative convergence
position are the endowment of capital Ki and human capital Hi, technology relevant gov-
ernment expenditure indicated by i, and international (and domestic) transaction costs
19See Appendix A3.3.
20The dynamic catching up spill-over equation contains a scaling problem if H and K are taken as
absolute values. As the region is assumed to remain backward, the values of ; '; H and K are assumed
to be su¢ ciently small. See Appendix A3.3 for the derivatives.
21We assume that the contribution of FDI to production  as well as the externality e¤ect of FDI on
technology  are su¢ ciently small. This also reects the already mentioned assumption of a rather limited
spill-over e¤ect of FDI on the relative catching up process.
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connected to exports  exi and FDI  i and hence the share of FDI 'i.
3.3 Two provinces and provincial equilibrium
To analyse interprovincial factor mobility and the e¤ects on provincial disparity, we need
to look at two provinces i = 1; 2 in a country. Both provinces have a local immobile factor
(human capital) and a mobile factor (domestic real capital).
K = K1(t) +K2(t);
dK2
dK1
=  1 < 0: (3.17)
The mobility of domestic factors between provinces represents a shift of resources.
As there is an interaction between the development position of a province and the
allocation of domestic capital, two conditions, the nal development condition and the
equilibrium condition for the domestic capital market (interest parity condition), have to
be considered.
3.3.1 Relative regional development
From equation (3.11) we know that !i is the steady state position of each province. The
relative steady state position for the two provinces for a given endowment is22
22See Appendix A3.4.
lim
K1!0

D = 0; lim
K1!o
d
D
dK1
=1; lim
K1!K

D =1; lim
K1!N
d
D
dK1
=1

DjK1=K2 = 1;
d
D
dK1 jK1=K2
= 2
(1     )
1      H
  
1 
1 K
 1
1 > 0;
for identical regions see Appendix A3.5.
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D =
!1
!2
=

A1
A2

=
	
(1 )
(1  )
1

H

1 
1 K
1  
1 
1
 (1 )
(1  )
	
(1 )
(1  )
2

H

1 
2 K
1  
1 
2
 (1 )
(1  )
(3.18)
d
D
dK1
> 0;
d
D
d1
< 0;
d
D
d ex1
< 0; and
d
D
d1
< 0 for 1 > 

1:
This condition is referred to as the nal development condition. The nal development
condition identies the relative technological position of a province compared to the other
province in steady state. In general, this relative nal position depends on all parameters
of 'i (see equation (3.12)) and in particular on the allocation of the mobile factor K to
the two provinces. Depending on K the nal development condition can be drawn as the
nal development curve 
D in the K1   
 diagram (Figure 34).
Dynamic adjustment can be directly derived from the equation of motion for each
single province. Denoting ai as the distance of the provinces present position relative to
the steady state position (ai = !i(t)=!i ), the dynamics are given by

(t) =
A1(t)
A2(t)
=)
_



=
_!1
!1
  _!2
!2
(3.19)
_
(t)

(t)
= a(t)
  1  
1 
1   a(t)
  1  
1 
2 < 0 for 
(t) > 

D:
For a1 > a2 the present position of the two provinces 
 is above23 the nal development
curve 
D in Figure 34. As we can see from equation (3.19) 
 decreases ( _

 < 0).24
23
 = !1(t)
!2(t)
=
a1!

1
a2!

2
= a1
a2

D:
24See Appendix A3.6.
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W
K1
WIP
(interest parity
condition)
WD
(final development
condition)
K
B0
B1
Figure 34: Steady state and dynamics
3.3.2 Regional factor mobility
In this model, domestic capital is the only mobile factor between provinces. As we assume
perfect competition in the nal goods market, domestic interest rates ii for domestic capital
in each province i are determined by marginal productivity25
ii =
1     
1   (1  i)A
1
1 
i H

1 
i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 iri
 
1 
K
 
1 
i : (3.20)
The arbitrage process is not perfect; adjustment takes time. Gradual adjustment to
interest parity translates into an imperfect arbitrage function
_K1(t) = m(
i1
i2
  1): (3.21)
In a no-arbitrage equilibrium _K1(t) = 0. For capital markets the assumption of a
gradually adjusting capital allocation seems rather odd. In a fully developed market econ-
25See Appendix A3.8.
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omy with a well-functioning nancial system, capital allocation would enter the model by
perfect and permanent interest arbitrage. However, China is a transition economy with
less-developed nancial institutions, where many nancial activities take place directly be-
tween rms. Even more, capital allocation may also be to some extent under government
control. Hence, given that capital allocation is not completely driven by non-economic
considerations, di¤erentials in return to capital should imperfectly and gradually direct
the allocation of capital. Therefore, a gradual adjustment of capital allocation seems the
appropriate way to capture the imperfectness of capital markets. Even in the long run we
may think of non-perfect interest arbitrage such that certain conditions prevent identical
returns on capital (i1=i2 = #). However, for the sake of simplicity we do not consider this
potentially long-term di¤erential and state that the potential interest parity equilibrium is
characterised by the interest parity condition
i1
i2
= 1: (3.22)
Further, as a matter of fact, concentration of capital in some provinces may also reect
a high rate of capital accumulation in these provinces. However, as long as market forces
dominate, accumulated capital will be allocated to the province with the highest return,
no matter where the accumulation took place. The location of accumulation becomes
less important for the eventual use of capital. In China, both driving forces behind a
concentration of capital, accumulation (because of high income) and allocation (because of
high productivity and high returns), seem to coincide. In this model we would like to focus
on disparity driving forces. Hence, mutual dependencies and competition for resources
are expected to be a major reason for disparity. An accumulated mobile resource at one
location will only have a major impact on the respective regional development if the region
is attractive enough to keep the resource at the location of original accumulation. Therefore,
we do not model the accumulation process as the most important factor determining the
relative concentration of resources. In a world with mobile resources we expect the highest
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return to dominate the provincial concentration of capital.
However, from condition (3.22) we can derive a curve describing all interest parity
positions of relative technological upgrading 
IP .26

IP =
!1
!2
=
A1
A2
=
(1  2)1  H2

(1 ex2 )(1 2)
2r2

K 2
(1  1)1  H1

(1 ex1 )(1 1)
1r1

K 1
(3.23)
d
IP
dK1
> 0 for identical provinces,
d
IP
dK1
<
=
>
0 in general,
d
IP
d1
> 0;
d
IP
d ex1
> 0;
d
IP
d1
> 0:
We refer to this condition as the interest parity curve. The interest parity curve27 is
also drawn in Figure 34. 
IP intersects the origin with an innite positive slope. With
increasingK1 the slope starts positively, may become negative and eventually turns positive
such that 
IP becomes innite when K1 approaches K [limK1!K 
IP =1].28
Dynamic adjustment is shown in Figure 34. If at a given endowment K1 in province
1 relative productivity is presently smaller than required by the interest parity condition,
domestic capital will move away from province 1 and K1 will decrease. Therefore, at any
point below the 
IP curve, domestic capital will ow out of province 1. This process is
indicated by the horizontal arrows in Figure 34.
3.3.3 Steady state
When both provinces are identical,29 there must be at least one equilibrium. Using the
implicit function theorem we obtain an equilibrium for the steady state of the relative
technology position 
ij = !

1=!

1
26For the derivative d

M
dK1
see Appendix A3.8.
27For the reactions of the interest parity curve see Appendix A3.10.
28The properties of the no-migration curve are given by limK1!0 

M = 0; limK1!0
d
M
dK1
= 1;
limK1!K 

M =1; limK1!N d

M
dK1
=1: See also Appendix A3.8.
29For identical regions all parameters and factor endowments (including K1 = K2) are identical.
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ij = 


ij

Hi
Hj
;
Ki
Kj
; :::

: (3.24)
At point B in Figure 34 the two provinces are identical since K1 = K2 and we consider
a stable case. For stability, the slope of the nal development curve must be atter than
the slope of the interest parity curve. The corresponding condition is30
d
D
dK1
<
d
IP
dK1
that is if  < : (3.25)
3.4 Endogenous provincial disparity
3.4.1 Preferential policies and international integration
For two provinces, the e¤ects of preferential policy for provincial disparity can be analysed.
Many local conditions, including bureaucratic policies, act like non-tari¤ trade barriers. If a
province reduces international transaction and information costs, it may be able to generate
a decisive advantage over other provinces. A non-symmetrical reduction in international
transaction costs via preferential policy can be translated into the model by d1 < 0 or
d ex1 < 0. As a result, the nal development curve 

D in Figure 34 shifts upward (see
equation(3.18)) and the interest parity curve 
IP shifts downward (see equation (3.23)).31
Starting from the original equilibrium point B0; the two provinces will move towards the
new equilibrium point B1. The existence of a number of stable inner solutions allows
for conditional convergence of provinces. Starting from B0 we nd a stable provincial
adjustment process.
The economic process is quite simple to describe. The change in international transac-
tion costs will trigger accelerating growth with two mutually dependent processes. First,
30See Appendix A3.11.
31 In this gure 
D shifts upwards and 
IP shifts downwards. In order to keep the gure simple, we draw
the relative shift of the two curves instead of shifting both curves at the same time.
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additional trade or FDI and positive externalities in one province will accelerate relative
technological growth in this province. Second, there is arbitrage of domestic capital to-
wards the faster growing province. As an inow of domestic capital and faster imitation
and growth of technologies are mutually favourable, an agglomerating process is initiated.
The internationally more integrated province with more inows of FDI and exports will
strongly improve its relative steady state position.
3.4.2 Factor mobility, agglomeration and disparity
Since arbitrage and agglomeration determine all other reactions, we start by analysing the
shift of domestic capital in province 132
dK1
d1
< 0;
dK1
d ex1
< 0:
In province 1, access to domestic capital will grow, while province 2 faces a reduction
and shrinks. Decreasing international transaction costs and better access to international
technologies in province 1 will increase technology growth and trigger agglomeration ad-
vantages for this province. Faster imitation increases productivity growth and an interest
gap between the provinces opens up. As domestic capital moves between the two provinces,
domestic capital migrates to the high-productivity and high-interest province. Inowing
capital and the resulting additional technological growth will drive a process of both ac-
celeration and agglomeration. In this process, the success of one province is driven at
the expense of the other since one province absorbs domestic capital from the other to
feed agglomeration. Technological acceleration endogenously terminates when imitation
becomes more di¢ cult and a province obtains more sophisticated technologies. Further,
factor mobility to the agglomerating province will eventually drive down interest rates by
decreasing marginal productivity. At the same time, emigrating domestic capital will drive
up marginal productivity in the less favoured province. Eventually, interest adjustment
32See Appendix A3.12.
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will equalise arbitrage incentives between the two provinces.
3.4.3 Analysing the determinants of disparity
The major focus of the paper is to analyse income disparity between provinces. Using the
model we can determine relative provincial income of a province i compared to a reference
province j (yij =
yi
yj
). This relative provincial income could be a rst indicator of bilateral
provincial disparity. With the theoretical model we can explain this income relation by
relative di¤erences in policies and relative di¤erences in factor abundance
yij =
yi
yj
= 
ij

Hi
Hj
;
Ki
Kj
; :::

Hi
Hj
Fi
Fj
 Ki
Kj
1  
(3.26)
log
yi
yj
= log
ij

::;
Ki
Kj
; ::

+  log
Hi
Hj
+  log
Fi
Fj + (1    ) log
Ki
Kj
:
Further, using comparative statics, we obtain the e¤ects of policy di¤erentials on mobile
factors and relative income. As an example of a policy, we analyse the relative income
reaction when international transaction costs are reduced dy

1
d1
. The reaction of the disparity
relation between the two provinces yij is
d logij = d log y

i   d log yj =
1
y1
dy1
d1
  1
y2
dy2
d1
dy1
d1
=
h1iz }| {
y1
!1
d!1
d1
+
0BBB@
h2iz }| {
y1
!1
d!1
dK1
+
h3iz }| {
(1    ) y

1
K1
1CCCA dK1d1 < 0;
dy2
d1
=  
0BBB@
h2iz }| {
y2
!2
d!2
dK2
+
h3iz }| {
(1    ) y

2
K2
1CCCA dK1d1 > 0; (3.27)
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for identical provinces
d lnyij =
1
y1
h1iz }| {
y1
!1
d!1
d1
+
0BBB@
h2iz }| {
K1
y1
y1
!1
d!1
dK1
+
h3iz }| {
(1    )
1CCCA d lnKij : (3.28)
Income di¤erentials between provinces are driven by three channels: a direct improve-
ment in technology h1i and two e¤ects from interprovincial factor arbitrage h2i and h3i.
Both factor mobility e¤ects are mutually reinforcing. Local policies not only a¤ect the
province itself but also others. Factor mobilityinternational and interprovincialclearly
has additional e¤ects on all provinces and on provincial disparity. The e¤ects of policies
are not limited to the policy making province. These disparity e¤ects are the focus of the
empirical study.
Up to this point we are still close to the standard income and growth analysis. The only
di¤erence is that in this approach we add the provincial interactions caused by provincial
factor mobility. Factor mobility can be a substantial additional disparity driving factor.
Therefore, in contrast to the standard growth regression, identifying the growth-driving
factors is not the only point of interest. And which growth driving factor contributes to
income divergence because it is diverging itself? In other words, we would like to identify
the determinants of disparity directly. In this respect, the goal of this exercise is similar to
the objectives of Tsui (2007) and Wan, Lu, and Chen (2007). However, the methodology
is di¤erent. While Tsui (2007) and Wan, Lu, and Chen (2007) apply a decomposition
method, we suggest a variation of the estimation equation. Table 3.1 gives an overview of
the most frequently used disparity measures and the properties of each measure.33
This table shows that disparity measures are expected to have an appropriate distance
concept related to the problem, and certain properties, such as the weak transfer principal,
scale independence or well-dened interval. As the di¤erent measures emphasise di¤erent
aspects of disparity they are not equally capable of solving all sorts of questions related to
33For more details see Cowell (1995).
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disparity.
In this paper we aim to explain provincial income disparity (measured by an appro-
priate disparity index) with the disparity of income determining factors. Since the Theil
index is decomposable into the di¤erent contributions of each province to the country-wide
Theil index of provincial disparity, and since it has an appropriate distance concept and all
required properties, we choose it as an appropriate instrument for the empirical analysis.
More precisely, we can determine each provinces Theil contribution to income disparity.
All these provincial contributions add up to the overall measure of provincial income dis-
parity. Moreover, we will explain the Theil contribution of income disparity by the Theil
contribution of the disparity determining variables such as capital, human capital etc.
THyi =
1
n
yi
y
log
yi
y
; THKi =
1
n
Ki
K
log
Ki
K
; :::
THyi = + 1TH
K
i + 2TH
HC
i ::: (3.29)
As disparity measured in distances is the target, the distance from the mean must be
included in the measurement concept. The Theil concept fulls this requirement using
an appropriate weighting scheme. Therefore, we choose an estimation approach where
the Theil index contribution of income in each province is determined by the Theil index
contribution of each explanatory variable of income derived from the theoretical model
above (see equation (3.29)).
3.5 Panel data analysis of provincial disparity
For the empirical study we suggest a panel data analysis. More specically, our point of
departure is a simple individual e¤ects model of the form
Yi;t = + X
0
i;t + ui;t; (3.30)
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where Yi;t is the dependent variable and X 0i;t is a set of explanatory variables. This method
allows for an inclusion of individual e¤ects for each province. Hence, uit = i+ "it denotes
the disturbance term that is composed of the individual e¤ect i and stochastic white noise
disturbance "it.34 The Hausman specication test determines whether the xed or random
e¤ects model should be used.
In order to analyse the determinants of inequality within China, it is necessary to use
provincial data to consider the provincesheterogeneity. Our data set covers the period
19912004 and includes annual data for 28 Chinese provinces, autonomous provinces and
municipalities.35 These are Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei,
Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai,
Ningxia and Xinjiang. Due to missing values the provinces Tibet and Hainan are excluded.
We use new income data reported by Hsueh and Li (1999) as well as various sources of
Chinese o¢ cial statistics provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to construct
our data set. These are the China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) from 19962004 and the
China Compendium of Statistics 19492004. The variables are described in detail below.
The basic goal is to explain provincial disparity in China. Moreover, disparities in
provincial income are caused by disparities in income dependent determining factors. In
this context, inequality is measured by the Theil index, and the dependent variable is
dened as the provincial contribution to the countrys inequality. To account for the
distribution of the explanatory variables we calculate the corresponding Theil indices for
all inequality factors and likewise compute analogically the provincial contribution to those
indices. Hence, we try to explain a provinces contribution to income inequality with the
34 In our case a LM test for the presence of individual e¤ects rejects the hypothesis that i = 0 so we
include an individual e¤ect.
35The choice of the period makes sense for two reasons. First, the early 1990s saw the latest wave of
international integration policy in China. Also in the early 1990s the Chinese government started to prepare
for WTO accession and a further opening up of the economy. Second, we want to focus on the period during
which Chinas inequality increased. As can be seen from the development of the Gini coe¢ cient and the
Theil index this period started in 1991. Third, with respect to some important indicators some provinces
would have had to be excluded if the time period had been expanded to earlier years.
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help of the share of inequality of other factors. Our estimation equation is directly derived
from the theoretical model presented above. The general equation of motion for the above
model (3.26) translates into the estimation equations with the following specication:
TH_GDPi;t = + 1TH_Ci;t + 2TH_HCi;t + 3TH_Ti;t (3.31)
+4TH_FDIi;t + 5TH_GOV 1i;t + 6TH_GOV 2i;t
+7TH_HIGHWAYi;t + i + "i;t;
where TH_GDPi;t denotes the contribution of province i to the countrys income in-
equality and TH_Ci;t, TH_HCi;t, TH_Ti;t, TH_FDIi;t, TH_GOV 1i;t, TH_GOV 2i;t
and TH_HIGHWAYi;t are the corresponding contributions to inequality in physical cap-
ital, human capital, trade, foreign direct investment, government expenditure and in-
frastructure measured in highways. The variables are calculated on the basis of the Theil
index contribution given by equation (3.2).
What is the interpretation of the coe¢ cients in this estimation equation? A positive
coe¢ cient indicates that income Theil disparityis driven by the Theil disparityof the
respective potential growth determinant. For example, the provincial Theil variation
of income positively relates to the Theil variation of capital, and hence the disparity
of capital positively contributes to disparity of income measured by the Theil index. A
negative coe¢ cient means that the provincial Theil variationof capital decreases income
disparity measured by the Theil index. The notation of the estimation equation is as
follows:36
Theil index contribution of income - TH_GDPi;t :
TH_GDPi;t denotes the contribution of province i to the countrys Theil index. The
provincial income used for the calculation is obtained from Hsueh and Li (1999) covering
36The Theil indices and their provincial contributions for all variables for 1991-2004 are presented in
Tables A34, A35, A36, A37, A38, A39, A310 and A311 in the Appendix.
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the period 19911995 and from various issues of the Statistical Yearbook of China for 1996
2004. GDP per capita expressed in current prices (Yuan) has been deated with 1995 as
the base year.
Theil index contribution of capital - TH_Ki;t :
TH_Ki;t denotes the corresponding Theil index of the real capital stock per capita. The
real physical capital stock for all provinces is estimated by using the standard perpetual
inventory approach. It is accumulated according to:
Kt+1 = It + (1  )Kt (3.32)
whereKt andKt+1 is the capital stock of year t and t+1 respectively, It denotes investment,
and  is the depreciation rate. The investment series used is gross xed capital formation
and is taken at current prices. It is taken from Hsueh and Li (1999) and from the Chinese
Statistical Yearbooks. Like Miyamoto and Liu (2005) we assume that the depreciation
rate  is 5 per cent for all provinces. To weight the initial capital stocks for each province,
we use the average ratio of provincial GDP to national GDP for each province over the
period 19521977. Following Wang and Yao (2003) we assume their estimate of 26,609.67
billion Yuan as the initial real capital stock for 1977 at the national level. By multiplying
this initial capital stock with the provincial weights we derive the initial capital stock for
each province. In order to calculate the real capital stock we use a new investment deator
provided by Hsueh and Li (1999) for the period 19781995 and combine it with the price
index for xed asset investment for the period 19962004.
Theil index contribution of human capital - TH_HCi;t :
TH_HCi;t is the Theil index contribution of human capital. The proxy for human capital
is enrolment in higher education as log of the share in the total population. We obtain the
data from the China Compendium of Statistics 19492004.
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Theil index contribution of trade - TH_Ti;t :
We use the log of trade calculated as the sum of imports and exports in GDP as a measure
of economic integration. The data are taken from the China Compendium of Statistics
19492004. We again compute the Theil index contribution TH_Ti;t for each province.
Theil index contribution of FDI - TH_FDIi;t :
The second variable measuring economic integration is foreign direct investment measured
as the log of FDI in GDP taken from the China Compendium of Statistics 19492004.
Because FDI data are available only in Yuan, we convert the data into US Dollars using
the national exchange rate for each year reported by the National Bureau of Statistics.
TH_FDIi;t denotes the Theil index share of this variable.
Theil index contribution of government expenditure - TH_GOV 1i;t, TH_GOV 2i;t :
Two variables can indicate the e¤ect of government expenditure on income inequality.
The rst is the Theil contribution of the share of local government general expenditure
in administration (TH_GOV 1i;t) and the second is the corresponding contribution of the
ratio of local government general expenditure on culture, education, science and public
health to GDP (TH_GOV 2i;t). Again, the source of the data is the China Compendium
of Statistics 1949-2004.
Theil index contribution of highway - TH_HIGHWAYi;t :
We use the Theil index contribution of the highway length per square kilometre (TH_HIGHWAYi;t)
as a proxy for the inequality in infrastructure. We obtain the data for the highway length
and the area in square kilometres from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004.
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables.
3.6 Estimation results
The results of the estimates are summarised in Table 3.3. It reports the results of the
xed e¤ects estimator for the period 19912004. We use the Hausman test to make an
77
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
TH_GDPi;t 392 0.005948 0.035057 -0.0131382 0.178702
TH_Ki;t 392 0.008862 0.050197 -0.0131385 0.259247
TH_HCi;t 392 0.009533 0.053248 -0.0131376 0.300175
TH_Ti;t 392 0.019382 0.086722 -0.0131386 0.560152
TH_FDIi;t 392 0.015733 0.056073 -0.0131385 0.363280
TH_GOV 1i;t 392 0.006625 0.042233 -0.0131347 0.297007
TH_GOV 2i;t 389 0.002112 0.013133 -0.0115511 0.051486
TH_HIGHWAYi;t 392 0.007260 0.027821 -0.0131386 0.130035
appropriate choice between random and xed e¤ects. With a p-value of 0.00 the test rejects
the hypothesis that the random and xed e¤ects estimators do not di¤er substantially, so
there is a correlation between i and X
0
i;t and the random e¤ects model is inconsistent.
Hence, the xed e¤ects model is the appropriate choice.37
Looking at Table 3.3, most explanatory variables enter with the sign predicted from the
model, except human capital. Hence, the major ndings from these estimates suggest that
both mean income and the typical growth determinants tend to have a positive impact on
inequality. Furthermore, it is the success of the eastern provinces that to a large extent
drives inequality.38
1. Domestic sources of inequality
 Controlling for other explanatory variables, the coe¢ cient for the inequality con-
37Since the usual R2 or adjusted R2 criteria are only appropriate if the model is estimated by OLS and
the xed e¤ects estimator is chosen to explain the within variation we report the R2within (Verbeek 2008,
p. 369).
38To avoid the problem of possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables we also run a system GMM
estimation. To check for the robustness of the FE estimator we additionally run an OLS estimation. The
results of both estimators are presented in Table A3.1. The coe¢ cient values are similar and conrm the
FE results; all signicant coe¢ cients show the same signs.
We tested for the presence of multicollinearity calculating variance ination factors (VIFs). VIF values
in excess of 10 often indicate a multicollinearity problem. The VIF values for the independent variables
ranged from 1.5 to 7.8 with a mean VIF of 3.5, this indicates that there is no serious multicollinearity
problem. See Table A3.2 for more detailed results.
The Breusch Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity rejects the hypothesis of constant variance,
so we use robust standard errors.
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Table 3.3: Fixed e¤ects estimation (1991-2004)
Dependant variable: TH_GDPi;t
Coe¤. Std. Err.
TH_Ki;t 0.302*** (0.017)
TH_HCi;t -0.015** (0.007)
TH_Ti;t 0.020*** (0.005)
TH_FDIi;t -0.020*** (0.003)
TH_GOV 1i;t -0.003 (0.005)
TH_GOV 2i;t -0.028 (0.022)
TH_HIGHWAYi;t 0.053*** (0.011)
CONS 0.003*** (0.000)
R2within 0.594
Obs 389
Hausman test: chi2(7)=531.42 Prob>chi2=0.00
Note: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
tribution of physical capital is highly signicant and has the strongest positive
e¤ect on inequality. This result is consistent with Tsui (2007), especially during
the last two decades, and Wan, Lu, and Chen (2007). It indicates that inequal-
ity in China is a phenomenon that is not only caused by foreign rms investing
in selected provinces of the country. The process of growth and disparity also
has strong and important domestic components. Like income disparity, physical
capital disparity shows the same pattern. It is also driven by a small number of
coastal provinces namely Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin.
 The same provinces account for a large share of the inequality in human capital.
However, in contrast to income disparity, disparity in human capital contin-
uously decreased over the period 19912004. The estimated coe¢ cient shows
a negative signicant impact on the dependent variable. Therefore, provincial
disparity in human capital does not contribute to provincial income disparity.
The negative sign even suggests that interprovincial disparity in human capital
leads to more equality. This result is consistent with Tsui (2007) who found that
human capital has made a small contribution to equality in more recent years.
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In Wan, Lu, and Chen (2007) education made a positive but small contribution
to disparity.
 Both coe¢ cients for provincial disparity of government activities have a neg-
ative impact on income disparity. Unlike income Theil disparity, disparity in
government activities is driven by completely di¤erent provinces. The inequal-
ity in expenditure in administration is mainly driven by the provinces Qinghai
and Gouizhou. Expenditure on culture, education, science and public health
is smaller and distributed more evenly. The provinces that are responsible for
income inequality enter with a negative contribution to Theil disparity for gov-
ernment expenditure. However, the e¤ects are not signicant in the case of the
FE estimator in contrast to the OLS and GMM estimator. This result clearly
di¤ers from the ndings of Wan, Lu, and Chen (2007).
 Infrastructure inequality, measured by the Theil index contribution of highway
length per square kilometres, is highly signicant and shows a strong e¤ect on
income inequality. The large Theil disparity in infrastructure leads to a large
income Theil inequality.
2. Openness and inequality
 The coe¢ cient of the inequality contribution of trade is signicant and has a
clear e¤ect on income inequality. This result supports the ndings of Spilim-
bergo, Londono, and Szekely (1999) at an individual level who suggest that
trade is signicantly positively associated with inequality.
 Openness inequality measured by the inequality contribution of FDI is also
signicant but shows a negative e¤ect on income disparity. In comparison to
the trade variable this may be due to the more even distribution of the Theil
index across the provinces, so the provinces that drive income inequality do
not have an accentuated impact on FDI disparity. Furthermore, in contrast
to income and trade disparity, FDI disparity shows a decreasing trend. This
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may suggest that the decreasing provincial FDI disparity contributes to higher
provincial income equality.
3.7 Summary and conclusion
The paper explains the growth-inequality nexus for Chinas provinces. The theoretical
model of provincial development consists of two regions and studies the interactions of
a mutual development process. Due to positive externalities, incoming trade and FDI
induce imitation and hence productivity growth. The regional government can inuence the
economy by changing international transaction costs and providing public infrastructure.
Due to mobile domestic capital, disparity e¤ects are reinforced. The implications of the
theoretical model are tested. As the central intention of the paper is to explain provincial
disparity, we directly relate income disparity (indicated by the contribution to the income
Theil index) to the disparity of selected income determining factors (indicated by the
contribution to each of the other Theil indices). We examine the determinants of inequality
for 28 Chinese provinces over the period 19912004 and apply xed e¤ects panel estimation.
The results conrm the theoretical framework and suggest a direct link between the factors
that determine regional income and regional disparity. More specically, it is apparent
that disparities in trade, foreign and domestic capital and infrastructure have an impact
on provincial income Theil disparity, whereas disparities in government expenditure and
human capital do not seem to drive income Theil disparity. Therefore, on the one hand,
three decades of government reforms led to an extraordinary success of some provinces
and hence increased disparity, and on the other hand, government expenditures and public
human capital investments seem to have had a stabilizing e¤ect on the development of
provincial disparity.
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Chapter 4
Short-run and long-run relations between growth,
inequality and poverty in the developing world
and China
This chapter is based on the paper Short-run and long-run dynamics of growth, inequal-
ity and poverty in the developing world by Gries, T. and Redlin, M. of the Center for
International Economics Working Paper Series.
4.1 Introduction
In recent years a series of theoretical and empirical contributions have studied the rela-
tionships between growth, inequality and poverty. It has become ever more apparent that
successful development strategies should not address each of these phenomena in isolation
but rather look at their interdependences and interactions. Bourguignon (2004) refers to
this relationship as the poverty-growth-inequality triangle; he points out that there is a
two-way relationship between growth and distribution which can be divided into the e¤ects
of growth on distribution and the e¤ects of inequality on growth. This interaction, in turn,
has an e¤ect on absolute poverty and poverty reduction, so a change in poverty can be
shown to be linked to growth, distribution and a change in distribution. Adams (2004)
argues that economic growth represents an important means for reducing poverty in the
developing world. His results show that since income distributions are relatively stable over
time, economic growth has the general e¤ect of raising incomes for all members of society,
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including the poor. This result is also consistent with Dollar and Kraay (2002) who point
out that several determinants of growth, such as the rule of law, openness to international
trade, and developed nancial markets, have little systematic e¤ect on the share of income
that accrues to the bottom quintile. Consequently, these factors benet the poorest fth
of society as much as they do everyone else. This makes clear that promising development
policies and poverty reduction should take account of possible relations between growth,
inequality and poverty. These relationships are the focus of numerous empirical studies.
As early as in the 1950s Kuznets (Kuznets 1955) suggested an inverted U-curve rela-
tionship between these variables, indicating that economic inequality increases over time
while a country is developing. Then, after a certain average income is attained, inequality
begins to decrease. Using standard growth regressions augmented by inequality measures,
OLS cross country estimates in most cases show a negative impact of inequality on growth
(see e.g. Perotti 1993, 1996, Alesina and Rodrik 1994 and Persson and Tabellini 1994).
Since these kinds of studies use initial inequality measures and regress it on GDP growth,
they disregard the perpetual changes in inequality and its potential interacting permanent
e¤ects on growth. Recent panel methods tend to exhibit a positive e¤ect, for instance
Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000). The results of Barro (2000) support the U-curve
relationship and suggest that for growth, higher inequality tends to retard growth in poor
countries and encourage growth in richer places.
Furthermore, the e¤ect of growth on poverty is also not as unambiguous as it appears
to be at rst sight. Of course, when holding inequality constant, higher economic growth
reduces poverty by increasing the income of the poor by the same rate as the income of
the total population. However, is growth really pro-poor, or is the combined e¤ect of
growth and inequality maybe counterproductive in terms of ghting poverty? Using a
large sample of countries spanning the past four decades Dollar and Kraay (2002) nd out
that the average income of the poorest fth of a country on average rises or falls at the
same rate as the general average. Naschold (2004) argues that the level of development
approximated by per capita consumption impacts on the poverty reducing e¤ect of growth.
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He shows that consumption growth elasticities in LDCs are only between one third and
one half of the level of elasticities in other developing countries. Squire (1993) and Bruno,
Ravallion and Squire (1998) argue that economic growth can be expected to reduce poverty,
but the latter also point out that poverty is also sensitive to inequality and even small
changes in the overall distribution of inequality can lead to sizeable changes in the incidence
of poverty. Recent studies such as Heltberg (2002), Bourguignon (2003) and Ravallion
(2005) have also shed light on the role of distribution changes in poverty reduction. They
emphasise that poverty elasticity depends strongly on the degree of inequality and that
growth reduces poverty more e¢ ciently in less inegalitarian countries. To highlight the
relationships between inequality and growth as well as between poverty and growth, a
possible causality between inequality and poverty should also be taken into consideration.
This paper expands the above literature by considering short-run and long-run dynam-
ics between growth, inequality, and poverty. Contrary to the most often applied regression
approach, where the e¤ect of a variable and a set of conditional variables are regressed on
the variable of interest, our focus is to identify a possible (Granger) causal relationship.
For instance, does higher growth lead to more inequality, or does more inequality reduce
growth potentials? Does an increasing inequality lead to more poverty, or does a reduc-
tion in poverty also result in a reduction in inequality? Are the causal e¤ect, stationary
long-term relations or more short-term transitory observations?
Without awareness of the directions of causality between these important policy tar-
gets it remains very di¢ cult to evaluate policies designed to bring about improvements
in any single of the three policy areas. Analysing these directions using panel causality
methods is the purpose of the paper. Hence, this paper di¤ers from existing studies in
three aspects. First, it considers all possible relationships between these three variables
by pairs, so we can clearly identify the causal directions of the triangle. Secondly, the
study is based on recently developed tests for panel unit roots and heterogeneous panel
cointegration. Furthermore, panel-based error correction models are applied to explore the
pairwise relationship between growth, inequality and poverty for a large panel of developing
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countries. Thirdly, in addition to the entire panel of 114 developing countries, we try to
capture possible income-related and regional di¤erences by analysing di¤erentiated subsets
of countries grouped by income and world regions. And nally, we use a panel data set for
rural and urban China to analyse China as one of the developing countries in more detail.
The purpose is to rst examine a general relationship, so in a rst step we analyse the
global relations between income growth, inequality and poverty for the developing world
using a broad panel of developing countries. In the subsequent step we focus on China and
examine the relations for the country separately. This allows us to identify if the relations
of growth, inequality and poverty in China are consistent with the general relations of the
developing world, or if China has an outstanding relevance compared to other developing
countries.
4.2 Growth, inequality and poverty triangle
Before we focus on the empirical causality relationships between per capita income growth,
poverty reduction and inequality, we rst review some fundamental theoretical relations
between the elements of this "triangle of development". These fundamental relations from
production theory mechanics link up growth, poverty reduction and inequality under rather
broad conditions. This review serves as a brief reminder and a benchmark for the subse-
quent empirical analysis which forms the core of this paper. In order to have a reference
system we look at a linear homogeneous production process. For this process we can derive
productivity and income for various groups and explain the connection between income
growth, inequality and poverty.
Production and per capita income: For a linear homogeneous production process
[Y = F (AL;K)] the factors are given by the technology A, physical labour L; and K as
accumulated productive asset (capital, human capital). Denoting population N and capital
intensity1 k, per capita income is y = YN , and per capita income growth is
1k is capital intensity for labour in e¢ ciency units. y = Y
N
= f(k)AnL; with nL = N=L and  being the
elasticity of production of capital.
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d ln y
dt
= 
d ln k
dt
+
d lnA
dt
: (4.1)
As long as the stationary state has not yet been reached, we have two engines of per
capita growth, increasing capital intensity _k > 0 and technical progress _A. For most
developing economies we can assume that stationarity has not been reached even if _k is
potentially of decreasing importance.
Inequality: In this simple view income inequality is generated by di¤erentials in factor
productivity and ownership of productive assets K. For simplicity we assume that total
population N consists of labour and asset owners2 who earn returns on productive assets
r. Typically, in developing economies the fraction of asset owners nK is small and capital
income per asset owner is high, such that asset owners represent high income groups and
pure labour income can be associated with lower income groups. Therefore, the ratio of
capital earnings per asset owner rK=NK versus wage income per worker wL can be dened
as a simple indicator of inequality3  = rKNK =wL =
rk
w nLK ; with nLK = L=NK . Changes in
inequality over time are determined by4
d ln 
dt
=

1  1


d ln k
dt
+
d lnnLK
dt
: (4.2)
According to (4.2) changes in income distribution are driven by two major factors,
changes in k and changes in the relative share of asset owners nLK . Rising capital intensity
would increase inequality if both factors were easy to substitute  > 1. In fact it is easy to
recall that (4.2) can lead to Kuznetsinverted U-curve relationship if an economy is still in
transition towards a stationary state and the share of asset owners continuously increases.
Poverty: To identify the link to poverty we look at an absolute poverty level. Labour
is not poor if it reaches at least a productivity that is slightly above the poverty level
2NK + L = N; with the fractions nL = L=N of labour and fraction nK = NK=N capital owners NK .
3 If factor prices are determined by marginal productivities, w describes wage per labour e¢ ciency unit
and wL is wage per worker.
4 = dk
d!
!
k
=   f 0
ff 00
f f 0 K
AL
K
AL
is the elasticity of substitution in production with ! = w=r:
86
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 
f   f 0 KAL

. Again, due to the development process k and A may grow over
time and change the number of people who are su¢ ciently productive to earn income equal
to or above the poverty line. Therefore, using the denition of capital intensity k = K=AL;
we can determine5 how many additional workers d lnL
'
dt > 0 could be employed at this or
a higher productivity level; the respective increase in employed labour denes a reduction
of poverty. Workers who just crossed the poverty line dene the level of poverty reduction
lnL'
dt
=
d ln k
dt
+


d lnA
dt
> 0: (4.3)
An increase in both k and A would improve labour productivity, and hence would shift
more people over the poverty line.
According to (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) all elements of the "triangle of development" have
either _A or _k or both as common factors. Hence, the respective partial relations between
growth, poverty, and inequality can be discussed in pairs.
Income growth and inequality: (4.1) and (4.2) suggest that increasing capital intensity
links both income growth and inequality. Per capita income growth goes hand in hand
with higher inequality if  > 1. In the early stages of development, when capital intensity
strongly increases and the share of asset owners remains rather constant, high income
growth and increasing inequality seems to be a likely pattern. Note that these conditions
describe the dynamics to the left of the maximum of the Kuznets curve. However, when the
economy develops _k may decline,6 and if simultaneously a higher share of people becomes
asset owners the economy may switch to the right of the maximum of the Kuznets curve.
Income growth and poverty: From (4.1) and (4.3) we obtain that growth enhancing
factors _k > 0 and _A > 0 may simultaneously reduce poverty. Technology growth and
increasing capital intensity may improve productivity also of the poor, so a rising number
5Therefore, the rst step is to nd out which relative changes in _k and _A allow workers to stay at least
at the income level of the poverty line d ln k
dt
=   

d lnA
dt
. If technical progress is positive _A > 0 productivity
is growing. Hence, the productivity of those who are barely above the poverty line ('  wL) could already
be reached even if capital intensity simultaneously declined _k < 0.
6E.g. under neoclassical growth conditions.
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of people can pass the poverty line while per capita income is generally growing. However,
other less positive scenarios are possible particularly if  < 1.
Inequality and poverty: According to (4.2) and (4.3), inequality and poverty are also
connected by capital intensity during non-stationary transition. For  > 1; increasing
capital intensity favours asset income, which leads to more inequality as long as the share
of asset holders remains rather stable. Simultaneously, increasing capital intensity improves
labour productivity, and an increasing number of people can pass the poverty line. However,
this is not the only possible outcome. Even if an increasing capital intensity k decreases
poverty and tends to increase inequality, a positive relation between poverty reduction and
more equality could be an observable, consistent phenomenon. If poverty reduction goes
along with an increasing share of people holding productive assets,7 decreasing inequality
is consistent with decreasing poverty.
While this discussion looks at consistent theoretical relations we should be aware of
that these partial relations could change for other values of . Also, this simple discussion
illustrates that there is neither an unequivocal relation suggested broad production theory
mechanics, nor is there a theoretical causality direction. In other words, the fact that
common driving factors, such as capital accumulation _k or productivity growth _A, link
e.g. income growth and poverty reduction, does not enable us to identify the direction of
causalities that are important for policy evaluation. For instance, does an improvement in
the productivity of the rural poor, which may lead to poverty reduction, cause an increase
in per capita income growth, or do higher per capita income growth rates e.g. in the
modern sector lift more people out of poverty (pro-poor growth)? Both causal directions
are consistent with fundamental theoretical relations drawn from production mechanics.
Therefore, it becomes very di¢ cult to evaluate policies designed to bring about improve-
ments in any of the three policy areas without awareness of the directions of causality
between them. Analysing these directions using panel causality methods is the purpose of
the paper and the following sections.
7Human capital may be such a productive asset that is available to a broader share of the population.
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4.3 Estimation: Developing world
4.3.1 Data
To get a general impression of the relationship between income growth, inequality and
poverty we start with an analysis of a broad panel of developing countries. The analysis is
based on data from the World Banks PovcalNet.8 This data set includes data on income
and poverty and inequality measures for several developing countries. To obtain a balanced
panel incomplete country time series were dropped so that the data set used in the analysis
refers to a balanced panel of 114 countries. The reference years currently available are 1981,
1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2005.9
In addition to the entire panel, we segment the data set into three subpanels according to
per capita income. We use the World Bank country classication that distinguishes between
low-income economies ($1005 or less), lower-middle-income economies ($1006 to $3975),
upper-middle-income economies ($3976 to $12275) and high-income economies ($12276
or more). As the country set contains only developing countries, the number of high-
income countries is too small for an autonomous analysis, therefore we merge the group
of upper-middle-income and high-income economies. Furthermore, to account for regional
di¤erences we use the World Bank´s regional segmentation and divide the data into six
subpanels according to their geographical location, namely East Asia and Pacic, Europe
and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. We can then analyse conditions that vary in terms of
culture, geography, administration and institutions. The variables used in the analysis are
dened in the following. Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics including the number
of observations, the mean and the standard deviation for the aggregate panel and the
subpanels.
8See Chen and Ravallion (2007). The data set is available at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet
(05-01-2012).
9Appendix A4.1 contains a detailed description of the dataset and the countries included in the analysis.
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Table 4.1: Summary and descriptive statistics
panel variable obs. mean std. dev.
Developing World income 1026 143.55 123.14
gini 1026 41.63 10.95
headcount 1026 29.99 27.99
low-income income 252 51.27 32.55
gini 252 44.41 9.57
headcount 252 60.22 20.67
lower-middle-income income 369 93.45 55.45
gini 369 41.96 9.54
headcount 369 33.43 22.99
upper-middle- and high-income income 405 246.62 129.46
gini 405 39.61 12.46
headcount 405 8.06 13.33
East Asia and Pacic income 117 78.77 58.23
gini 117 37.28 7.51
headcount 117 40.38 25.44
Europe and Central Asia income 243 257.57 152.75
gini 243 30.86 7.49
headcount 243 5.12 10.66
Latin America and the Caribbean income 189 210.44 91.36
gini 189 50.40 6.05
headcount 189 13.70 13.57
Middle East and North Africa income 72 151.09 46.14
gini 72 38.51 3.79
headcount 72 5.51 4.25
South Asia income 54 58.36 17.61
gini 54 34.93 6.20
headcount 54 41.56 15.10
Sub-Saharan Africa income 351 61.75 38.78
gini 351 47.49 9.66
headcount 351 55.77 21.09
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mean income - yi;t :
Mean income yi;t is measured in average monthly per capita income/consumption expen-
diture (PPP) from the survey in 2005.
headcount - hi;t :
Headcount hi;t denotes the percentage of the population living in households with consump-
tion or income per person below the poverty line. The analysis is based on a $1.25/day
poverty line and income data at 2005 prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).10
Gini coe¢ cient - ginii;t :
We use the Gini coe¢ cient ginii;t in its common denition as a measure of inequality.
To obtain a rst impression of the relationships between growth, inequality and poverty
we plot these variables by pairs. The diagrams presented in Figures A4.1, A4.2 and A4.3
also include the prediction graphs of the linear regressions. The gures show a weak positive
relationship between inequality and growth and between inequality and poverty and a
strong negative relationship between growth and poverty. The correlation matrix (Table
A4.1) conrms these results, showing a weak positive correlation between growth and
inequality and between inequality and poverty and a strong negative correlation between
growth and poverty. However, it is a moot point whether and if so to what extent these
variables have a causal e¤ect on each other. The concept of the error correction model
(ECM) is an adequate methodology to test these causality relations in the short and long
run.
4.3.2 Methodology
Following Yasar, Nelson and Rejesus (2006) we suggest applying a generalised one-step
ECM to explore the pairwise short-run and long-run dynamics between growth, changes in
inequality and poverty, and to use a panel data analysis and GMM estimation. We prefer
10We also ran the analysis using a $1/day and $2/day poverty line. The results are robust to those of
the $1.25/day poverty line.
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dynamic panel estimators for various reasons. The dynamic panel procedure allows us to
control for country specic e¤ects, whereas the OLS estimator assumes that the intercept
that captures the e¤ect of all omitted and unobservable variables is the same for all coun-
tries. This individual e¤ect may correlate with the included explanatory variables, hence
omitting the individual e¤ect would become part of the error term, which would lead to a
bias in the estimates. Furthermore, in comparison to the standard xed e¤ect estimator,
GMM estimation also circumvents the bias associated with including a lagged dependent
variable as a regressor and enables us to calculate consistent and e¢ cient estimates. Ad-
ditionally, by combining the time series dimension with the cross-sectional dimension, the
panel data set yields a richer set of information to exploit the relationship between the de-
pendent and independent variables, reduces collinearity among the explanatory variables,
increases the degrees of freedom and gives more variability and e¢ ciency. More specically,
our point of departure is a bivariate autoregressive-distributed lag (ADL) model
yi;t = 0 +
2X
j=1
jyi;t j +
2X
j=0
jxi;t j + fi + ui;t (4.4)
xi;t = 0 +
2X
j=1
jxi;t j +
2X
j=0
jyi;t j + i + i;t (4.5)
where index i=1...N refers to the country and t=1...T to the period. This method allows
us to include specic e¤ects for each country (fi and i). The disturbances ui;t and i;t
are assumed to be independently distributed across countries with a zero mean. They may
display heteroskedasticity across time and countries, though. Following Granger (1969)
there is Granger causality from x to y if past values of x improve the prediction of y given
the past values of y. With respect to the model, x Granger causes y if not all j are zero.
Likewise, Granger causality from y to x occurs if not all j are equal to zero. However,
Engle and Granger (1987) have shown that, if the series x and y are cointegrated, the
standard Granger causality test is misspecied. In this case an error correction model
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should be used instead. So the rst step of the standard procedure is a unit root and a
cointegration test. On the basis of the results we determine whether to use the Granger
causality framework or an ECM model to test for causality.
Panel unit root test:
The Granger causality test requires the variables to be stationary. To check the stationarity
of the data two common panel unit root tests are used, the IPS test by Im, Pesaran and
Shin (2003) and the Fisher-type test by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001).
Formally, the test equation of both tests is
4yi;t = i + iyi;t 1 + "it. (4.6)
The null hypothesis is that each cross-section series in the panel has a unit root. The
alternative hypothesis is that there is at least one stationary cross-sectional series in the
panel. Additionally, the formulation allows i to di¤er across cross-sections so that both
tests allow for heterogeneity.
H0 : i = 0 for all i (4.7)
H1 : i < 0; i = 1; 2; :::; N1; i = 0; i = N1 + 1; N2 + 1; :::N: (4.8)
The IPS test is a t-bar statistic based on the (augmented) Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and
Fuller 1979) statistic. It computes the sample mean of the individual unit root tests for each
of the N cross-section units. The main idea of the Fisher-type unit root test is to combine
p-values from a unit root test applied to each cross-section in the panel data. While both
IPS and the Fisher-type test combine information based on individual unit root tests, the
crucial di¤erence between the two is that the IPS test combines the test statistics, while the
Fisher-type test combines the signicance levels of the di¤erent tests. Table 4.2 presents
the results of both tests for the three variables in levels and in rst di¤erences. The results
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Table 4.2: Panel unit root test: Developing world
variable deterministic IPS Fisher-type rst di¤. rst di¤.
IPS Fisher-type
income constant -1.3304 181.0720 -2.2473*** 567.2075***
const. + trend -1.4954 149.3162 -2.3798*** 429.7042***
headcount constant -0.7931 231.3120 -2.6250*** 629.6471***
const. + trend -1.7922* 230.8615 -2.8992*** 771.9503***
gini constant -0.9227 97.2107 -1.8864*** 343.2793***
const. + trend -1.3753 94.5892 -2.0969*** 229.6464***
Notes:
* Rejects the null of a unit root at the 10% level.
** Rejects the null of a unit root at the 5% level.
*** Rejects the null of a unit root at the 1% level.
indicate that for the variables in levels the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected.
However, the test coe¢ cients of the di¤erenced variables are highly signicant and show
stationarity in all three cases, regardless of whether a trend is included in the test or not.
On this account the following analysis is based on the di¤erenced data, namely income
growth and the changes in poverty and inequality.
Panel cointegration test:
Since the panel unit root tests indicate that the variables are integrated of order one
I(1), the pairwise cointegration is tested using the panel cointegration test developed by
Pedroni (1999, 2004). This test allows for heterogeneity in the panel by permitting het-
erogenous slope coe¢ cients, xed e¤ects and individual specic deterministic trends. The
test contains seven cointegration statistics, four based on pooling the residuals along the
"within-dimension", which assume a common value for the unit root coe¢ cient, and three
based on pooling the residuals along the "between-dimension", which allow for di¤erent
values of the unit root coe¢ cient. The basic idea of both classes is to rst estimate the
hypothesised cointegration relationship separately for each group member of the panel, and
then pool the resulting residuals when constructing the test for the null of no cointegration.
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Table 4.3: Panel cointegration test: Developing world
income-gini income-headcount gini-headcount
Panel -test -2.5645** -4.2343*** -2.6806**
Panel -test 5.3051*** 5.2714*** 6.4547***
Panel pp-test -9.3499*** -10.4257*** -4.4079***
Panel adf -test -8.1522*** -9.3947*** -4.7184***
Group -test 8.3547*** 9.0651*** 9.3222***
Group pp-test 13.2408*** 12.3244*** -5.0807***
Group adf -test -4.7604*** -5.8833*** 2.2087**
Notes:
The tests are based on deterministic intercept and trend, and an inclusion of one lag.
* Rejects the null of no cointergation at the 10% level.
** Rejects the null of no cointergation at the 5% level.
*** Rejects the null of no cointergation at the 1% level.
Table 4.3 presents the results for the three pairs of variables. In all cases the null of no
cointegration is rejected on at least the 5% signicance level, indicating that all three pairs
of variables exhibit a cointegration relationship.
Error correction model:
Engle and Granger (1987) have shown that, when the series x and y are cointegrated, a
standard Granger-causality test, as presented in the equations (4.4) and (4.5), is misspec-
ied. It does not allow for the distinction between the short-run and the long-run e¤ect.
At this point an error correction model (ECM) should be used instead. It is a linear trans-
formation of the ADL models above and provides a link between the short-run and the
long-run e¤ect (Banerjee et al. 1993, Banerjee, Daldo and Mestre 1998).
yi;t = (1   1)yi;t 1 + 0xi;t + (0 + 1)xi;t 1
+(yi;t 2   xi;t 2) + fi + ui;t (4.9)
xi;t = (1   1)xi;t 1 + 0yi;t + (0 + 1)yi;t 1
+(xi;t 2   yi;t 2) + i + i;t (4.10)
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The coe¢ cients (1  1), 0 and (0+ 1) as well as (1  1), 0 and (0+ 1) capture
the short-run e¤ect, while the coe¢ cients  and  of the error correction term give the
adjustment rate at which short-run dynamics converge to the long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship. If  and  are negative and signicant, a relationship between x and y exists in
the long run. The standard procedure is a two-step method where rst the error correction
term is obtained by saving residuals of separate estimation of the long-run equilibrium, and
then the model is estimated. However, the two-stage error correction models have been
criticised in the literature. Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre (1998) argue there can be a sub-
stantial small-sample bias, compared to a single-equation error correction model where the
long-run relation is restricted to being homogeneous. So in this study a one-step procedure
is used to indicate the short-run and long-run dynamics. The generalised one-step ECM is
transformed as follows:
yi;t = (1   1)yi;t 1 + 0xi;t + (0 + 1)xi;t 1
+(yi;t 2   xi;t 2) + xi;t 2 + fi + ui;t (4.11)
xi;t = (1   1)xi;t 1 + 0yi;t + (0 + 1)xi;t 1
+(xi;t 2   yi;t 2) + #xi;t 2 + i + i;t (4.12)
where the long-run multiplier is restricted to being homogeneous  = 1. Using this form
of the error correction model allows us to calculate the true long-run relationship between x
and y, which can be written as 1 (
^
=
^
) and 1 (
^
#=^), so that the one step ECM permits us
to directly calculate the short-run and long-run elasticities between growth, inequality and
poverty. To avoid the problem of biased estimates through a possible correlation between
the lagged endogenous variable and the error term, we use the Di¤erence GMM estimator
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The estimator uses all lagged observations to
instrument the lagged endogenous variable and circumvent a possible bias. These moment
conditions of the instruments can be checked using the Sargan statistic that tests the
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validity of all instruments. Using the lagged levels dated t   2 and earlier as instruments
for the equation in rst di¤erences, we obtain consistent and e¢ cient parameter estimates.11
4.3.3 Results
The results of the corresponding error correction regressions are summarised in Table 4.4.
Tables A4.2 to A4.7 in the Appendix give the complete picture. They include the coe¢ -
cients of the regression, the summation of the short-run and the long-run e¤ect with the
corresponding Wald test p-values, the Sargan test and the M1 and M2 tests for the regres-
sions. Tables A4.2 and A4.3 explore the dynamics between income growth and changes
in inequality, Tables A4.4 and A4.5 investigate the relations between income growth and
changes in poverty, and Tables A4.6 and A4.7 reect the dynamics of changes in inequality
and changes in poverty. The tables include the pairwise relationship of two variables, so
the rst output table contains the results with reference to equation (4.11) whereas the
second table is based on equation (4.12). The rst column shows the results for the whole
panel of 114 developing countries, while the other nine columns show the results for the
income and regional subpanels.
To verify GMM consistency, we have to make sure that the instruments are valid. We
use the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions to test the validity of the instrumental
variables, which is a general specication test. The hypothesis assumes that the orthogo-
nality conditions of the instrumental variables are satised. In the case of the Di¤erence
estimator the test indicates that the instruments, as expected, do not correlate with the
error term in most of the cases. To check the validity of the System GMM estimator the
validity of lagged levels combined with lagged rst di¤erences should be considered. In
these cases the p-values show less satisfactory results, while the Di¤erence Sargan test,
which considers only the additionally used instruments for the System equation, returns
insu¢ cient results as well. For this reason we only present the results of the Di¤erence
GMM estimator.
11For a detailed illustration of the GMM estimator see Chapter 2.3.
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The coe¢ cients of the error correction term give the adjustment rate at which short-
run dynamics converge to the long-run equilibrium relationship. Generally, except for one
value, all these coe¢ cients are negative and highly signicant as expected, so the results
show that there long-run relationships and provide evidence of a cointegration relationship
between all pairs of variables.
The short-run e¤ect can be divided into the e¤ect of the lagged dependent variable and
that of the independent variable. The short-time adjustment of the independent variable
is measured by the e¤ect of the contemporaneous and lagged change of the independent
variable. The signicance of the summarised short-run e¤ects, which is simply the sum of
the two coe¢ cient values, is tested via a Wald test. It tests if the coe¢ cients are jointly
equal to zero. The long-run coe¢ cients indicate the long-run elasticities of the independent
on the dependent variable. They are computed by subtracting the ratio of the coe¢ cient
of the scale e¤ect (lag of independent variable) from the coe¢ cient of the error correction
term; again a Wald test proves the signicance of the e¤ect.
In Table 4.4 the short-run and long-run dynamic results are characterised pairwise:
1. With regard to the relationship between per capita income growth and changes in
inequality presented in Table 4.4 (Tables A4.2 and A4.3), the results of the short-run
e¤ect indicate a positive signicant causal e¤ect from changes in inequality on growth
and vice versa for the aggregate panel and several subpanels. In other words, higher
changes in inequality, measured by changes in the Gini coe¢ cient, generate higher
economic growth and higher economic growth causes an increase in the changes of in-
equality. This is contradictory to the results of Perotti (1993, 1996) and Alesina and
Rodrik (1994) who nd an overall tendency for inequality to generate lower economic
growth in cross-country studies. Whereas these kinds of studies only capture the ini-
tial inequality and regress it on average GDP growth, the error correction framework
allows detecting permanent changes of inequality over time and their perpetual causal
e¤ect on growth. Existing panel studies are in line with our results. Based on growth
regressions, these studies show that there is a positive causal e¤ect between growth
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and inequality, and that faster growth tends to increase inequality. For example, Li
and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) have reported a positive relationship of inequality
on growth and Barro (2001) suggests that higher inequality tends to retard growth
in poor countries and encourage growth in richer ones. With respect to the Kuznets
relation this also suggests that these countries are situated in the rst stage of the
Kuznets curve, where inequality increases. Economic development involves a shift of
persons and resources from agriculture to the industrial sector. So at the early stage
of development the urban and industrial sector, as a small and relatively rich group
of persons, expand and lead to a shift that induces a rise in the average per capita
income and simultaneously this change raises the overall degree of inequality. Conse-
quently, at early stages of development, the relation between the level of per capita
product and the extent of inequality tends to be positive. According to Galor and
Tsiddon (1997) inequality and growth are positively related during periods of major
technological inventions. They argue that in these periods a decline in the relative
importance of initial conditions raises inequality, enhances mobility, and generates a
larger concentration of high-ability individuals in technologically advanced sectors,
stimulating future technological progress and growth. Only the subpanel for South
Asia exhibits a negative signicant e¤ect of growth on inequality, which indicates that
the capital intensifying process is less dominant, pushing the economy to the right
of the maximum of the Kuznets curve and allowing for decreasing inequality. By
contrast, the short-run e¤ect of the lagged rst di¤erence of the dependent variable
is negative and highly signicantly related to the simultaneous change of the depen-
dent variable for both income and inequality. This means that in the short run rising
inequality is harmful for growth and likewise an increase in income growth causes a
reduction in inequality. Concerning the results of the subpanels, the long-run coe¢ -
cient is signicant only in the case of a few subpanels and the e¤ect is positive. The
error correction term is always negative and signicant. However, as shown in Table
4.4, the results of the income subpanels show that the short-run growth adjustment is
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faster the higher the average income while the adjustment of inequality is slower with
growing income. This is in line with the results of the regional subpanels that show
that regions with lower income and higher poverty, namely South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa and East Asia and Pacic, exhibit a faster short-run growth adjustment, while
the adjustment of inequality is slower compared to the regions with higher income.
2. Concerning the dynamics between income growth and changes in poverty presented
in Table 4.4 (Tables A4.4 and A4.5), the results show a clear negative short-run
and long-run relationship between these variables. In other words, higher economic
growth reduces the extent of poverty measured by changes in the headcount, and
in turn falling poverty generates higher income growth. This is consistent with the
evidence in the empirical literature which suggests that economic growth is in practice
the main tool for ghting poverty (Squire 1993 and Bruno, Ravallion and Squire
1998). Nearly all parameter coe¢ cients in the regressions of the aggregate panel and
the subpanels show a negative e¤ect at the 1% signicance level. The results further
reveal that there is bidirectional causality between growth and changes in poverty,
indicating that higher growth reduces poverty and vice versa, although the long-
run e¤ect is only half as strong as the short-run e¤ect. Consequently, it becomes
apparent that the growth process raises not only the mean income of the country
but also the income of the poor and lifts a fraction of the poor population out of
poverty. Furthermore, it is evident that in poorer regions poverty reduction has
a stronger e¤ect on growth, yet growth has a weaker e¤ect on poverty reduction
compared with the wealthier subpanels. This indicates that the level of development
impacts on the poverty-reducing e¤ect of growth. Income growth has beneted the
poor regions far less. On the other hand poverty decelerates income growth much
more slowly in countries with higher average income. So altogether the positive e¤ect
of growth on poverty increases with average income and the negative e¤ect of poverty
on growth diminishes with average income. However, it must be pointed out that
here we measure poverty using an absolute poverty line, so we account only for the
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section of the population that moves from one side of the poverty line to the other.
We have no information about the redistribution e¤ect of growth below and above
the poverty line. The short-run e¤ect of the lagged rst di¤erence of the dependent
variable is again negative and highly signicant related to the simultaneous change
of the dependent variable for both directions.
3. Finally, Table 4.4 (Tables A4.6 and A4.7) presents the relationship between changes
in inequality and changes in poverty. The long-run e¤ect is positive and signicant
in both cases indicating that higher inequality generates higher poverty and reversed
a rise in the headcount causes a rise in the Gini coe¢ cient. However, the short-
run e¤ect is only signicant and positive when poverty is the dependent variable.
Also, some of the subpanels exhibit a positive short-run and/or long-run e¤ect. In
summary, the results suggest a positive causal e¤ect of poverty on inequality and vice
versa, conrming recent literature. Ravallion (2001, 2005) and Bourguignon (2004)
suggest that the elasticity of poverty to growth declines appreciably as the extent
of initial inequality rises. Ravallion (1997) concludes that at any positive rate of
growth, the higher the initial inequality, the lower the rate at which income-poverty
falls. Deininger and Squire (1997) show that inequality reduces income growth for
the poor. Hence, our ndings conrm the suggestion that poverty reduction depends
strongly on the degree of inequality and that growth reduces poverty more e¢ ciently
in more egalitarian countries. Consequently, poverty reduction is determined by
growth, income distribution and the change in distribution.
In summary, the results of the study show that all pairs of variables exhibit a causal
relationship in both directions and that growth, distribution and poverty reduction are
strongly interrelated, so rapid poverty reduction requires a country-specic combination of
growth and redistribution policies.
102
4.4 Estimation: China
4.4.1 Data
After analysing general relations in a panel of developing countries, in this section we want
to focus on China as one of the developing countries and examine the causal relationships
between growth, inequality and poverty using more di¤erentiated data for the country. In
the previous analysis China was classied as one of the upper-middle income countries,
geographically it belongs to the subpanel of East Asia and Pacic. By analysing China
separately we want to investigate if the country data reects the results of the previous
analysis. In an optimal way the analysis should be based on provincial data. This would
allow accounting for the disparity in the development levels of the provinces and would make
the results more comparable to the results of chapter 2 and 3. Unfortunately, inequality
and poverty variables are not available for China at provincial level. However, to maximise
the number of observation points and so the degrees of freedom we di¤erentiate the data
by distinguishing between rural and urban China. And notwithstanding we are aware
of the big limitation of pooling rural and urban since the rural and urban regions can
exhibit di¤erent cause-e¤ect relationships between the variables of interest, the length of
the available time period is insu¢ cient for a pure time series analysis. The analysis is
based on data from Ravallion and Chen (2007). They provide a data set on income and
poverty and inequality measures for urban and rural China based on the Urban Household
Surveys and the Rural Household Surveys of Chinas National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
over the period 1981-2001. In the following, the variables used in the analysis are dened
and described. To make the analysis comparable to the country panel analysis we base it
on nearly the same variables and time period. Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics
including the mean and the standard deviation for the aggregate panel and the urban and
rural subpanels.
mean income yi;t :
Mean income yi;t is measured by the average yearly per capita income in Yuan at 1980
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Table 4.5: Summary and descriptive statistics: China
panel variable mean std. dev.
China income 547.8852 207.7598
gini 27.51762 5.578252
headcount 13.68119 15.05609
Urban income 672.1267 203.7168
gini 24.2619 5.3354
headcount 1.8400 1.7172
Rural income 423.6438 120.7081
gini 30.7733 3.6144
headcount 25.5224 12.9348
prices.
headcount hi;t :
Headcount hi;t denotes the percentage of population living in households with consump-
tion or income per person below the poverty line. Ravallion and Chen (2007) distinguish
between an urban and a rural poverty line. The poverty line for the urban region is 1,200
Yuan and the poverty line for the rural region is 850 Yuan per person and year in 2002
prices. The data is deated by the urban and rural Consumer Price Indices produced by
NBS.
Gini coe¢ cient ginii;t :
We use the Gini coe¢ cient ginii;t in its common denition as a measure of inequality.
4.4.2 Methodology
Again we use the panel unit root tests and cointegration tests to determine whether to use
the Granger causality framework or an ECM model to test for causality.
Panel unit root test:
Table 4.6 presents the results of the tests for the variables in levels and in di¤erences.
The results indicate that while the level data is non-stationary the test coe¢ cients of the
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Table 4.6: Panel unit root test: China
variable deterministic IPS Fisher-type rst di¤. rst di¤.
IPS Fisher-type
income constant 2.1980 0.5810 -2.3828*** 22.5510***
const. + trend -0.3226 1.0246 -2.2453** 15.9358***
headcount constant -0.2755 3.0440 -2.9026*** 34.1741***
const. + trend -1.0820 3.4818 -2.8535*** 24.2197***
gini constant -0.0262 2.5881 -3.7319*** 56.8305***
const. + trend -1.5495* 4.8650 -3.7473*** 45.9044***
Notes:
* Rejects the null of a unit root at the 10% level.
** Rejects the null of a unit root at the 5% level.
*** Rejects the null of a unit root at the 1% level.
di¤erenced variables are highly signicant and show stationarity in all three cases regardless
of whether a trend is included in the test or not. Since the variables are integrated of order
one I(1), in the next step we test for cointegration.
Panel cointegration test:
To test for cointegration once more we use the panel cointegration test developed by Pedroni
(1999, 2004). Table 4.7 presents the results of the three pairs of variables. In nearly all
cases the null hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted. This result is contradictory to
the result of the previous analysis and indicates that all three pairs of variables exhibit no
cointegration relationship. In this case a standard Granger causality test can be performed
to identify the causal relationship between the variables.
Granger causality test: Lag length selection:
The Granger causality test is based on the following bivariate model
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Table 4.7: Panel cointegration test: China
income-gini income-headcount gini-headcount
Panel -test -2.9736*** 2.5538*** 1.4290*
Panel -test 0.7694 1.1264 -0.3459
Panel pp-test 0.8562 1.0151 -1.2845*
Panel adf -test 1.11663 2.8399 -0.3648
Group -test 1.2716 1.5992 0.3083
Group pp-test 1.3438 1.7288 -0.9327
Group adf -test 1.4113 3.3154 -0.8635
Notes:
The tests are based on deterministic intercept and trend, and an inclusion of one lag.
* Rejects the null of no cointergation at the 10% level.
** Rejects the null of no cointergation at the 5% level.
*** Rejects the null of no cointergation at the 1% level.
yi;t = 0 +
nX
j=1
jyi;t j +
nX
j=0
jxi;t j + fi + ui;t (4.13)
xi;t = 0 +
mX
j=1
jxi;t j +
mX
j=0
jyi;t j + i + i;t: (4.14)
It is generally acknowledged that the results of the Granger causality test are sensitive to
the specication of the lag length. We check for the lag length selection using a sequential
Wald test on the results for each of the six equations. Table 4.8 presents the results of the
sequential Wald test for one up to four lags based on the Blundell and Bond estimator.
The results indicate that for all models except the third two lags should be taken into
consideration. The third model should be based on only one lag.
4.4.3 Results
Table 4.9 presents a summary of the Granger tests based on the lag length selection.12 It
includes the coe¢ cients of the regression on which the Wald Non-causality test is based,
12Detailed results of the corresponding regressions are listed in Tables A4.8 to A4.13 in the Appendix.
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Table 4.8: Lag length selection
model chi2( 1) chi2( 2) chi2( 3) chi2( 4)
inequality does 9.45 5.57 0.74 1.36
not cause growth (0.0089) (0.0616) (0.6902) (0.5068)
growth does 12.78 6.95 1.50 8.74
not cause inequality (0.0017) (0.0309) (0.4718) (0.0127)
growth does 30.73 4.11 4.79 10.63
not cause poverty (0.0000) (0.1278) (0.0912) (0.0049)
poverty does 11.90 6.20 2.70 1.24
not cause growth (0.0026) (0.0451) (0.2588) (0.5377)
inequality does 205.50 5.63 0.75 6.11
not cause poverty (0.0000) (0.0599) (0.6867) (0.0471)
poverty does 4.72 8.68 2.94 11.37
not cause inequality (0.0943) (0.0131) (0.2296) (0.0034)
the results of the Wald test, the Sargan test and the AR1 and AR2 test for the regressions.
For all models the Sargan statistics are satisfactory and the AR2 tests indicate that the
instruments, as expected, do not correlate with the error term.
1. The rst two rows show the causality relations between changes in inequality and in-
come growth. Although all coe¢ cients show a negative e¤ect, only the direction run-
ning from growth to changes in inequality is signicant.13 The hypothesis that growth
does not cause inequality is rejected at the 1% signicance level. This means that
higher income growth Granger causes a decline in inequality measured by changes
in the Gini coe¢ cient.14 According to the Kuznets (Kuznets 1955) inverted U-curve
inequality rises with growth at least at the initial stages of the development process.
Then, after a certain average income is attained, inequality begins to decrease. So
increased inequality is an undesirable consequence of the growth process because it
13Correlation coe¢ cient between growth and the lagged value of changes in inequality which are 0.01 for
the whole panel, 0.06 for urban China and -0.09 for rural China also indicates that the impact of the lagged
inequality measure on growth is very small.
14This result is mainly driven by the urban sector. While the correlation coe¢ cient of changes in inequality
and the lagged value of growth is -0.25 for the whole panel, the urban sector shows a correlation of -0.62,
however, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.24 the rural sector shows a positive impact of lagged growth
on inequality. It becomes apparent that the mechanism of action is not the same for the urban and rural
sector.
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Table 4.9: Granger causality test
Null hypothesis coe¤. Wald test Sargan AR1 AR2
inequality does -0.0663 chi2( 2) = 3.69 44.7523 -1.4132 -0.9117
not cause growth -0.2322 (0.1577) (0.6067) (0.1576) (0.3619)
growth does -0.5398 chi2( 2) = 13.36 40.0319 -1.3881 0.8241
not cause inequality -0.3067 (0.0003) (0.7864) (0.1651) (0.4099)
growth does -5.0525 chi2( 1) = 4.47 52.7787 -1.1409 -1.3629
not cause poverty (0.0344) (0.4438) (0.2539) (0.1729)
poverty does -0.0247 chi2( 2) = 6.09 46.8215 -1.4142 1.3886
not cause growth -0.0173 (0.0477) (0.5211) (0.1573) (0.1650)
inequality does -2.6571 chi2( 2) = 4.31 50.3973 -1.1189 -1.0608
not cause poverty 1.9821 (0.1159) (0.3788) (0.2632) (0.2888)
poverty does -0.0124 chi2( 2) =5.61 49.5234 -1.2514 -0.6424
not cause inequality -0.0516 (0.0605) (0.4122) (0.2108) (0.5206)
may imply that certain population groups are left behind and do not enjoy the fruits
of growth. With reference to China our results show that the country has already
passed the turning point. After a period of rising inequality due to the preferential
open door policy that promoted mainly the coastal region now China, in particular
the urban sector, seems to be on a path of decreasing inequality.15 Using the urban
rural income ratio as a measure of inequality Wan, Lu and Chen (2006) also nd a
negative e¤ect of growth on inequality, they conclude that amongst others income
growth reduces the ruralurban income gap, however in contrast to our results they
also nd a negative e¤ect of inequality on growth.
2. The rows three and four show the causalities between income growth and poverty.
The coe¢ cients are negative and the Wald test rejects the non-causality hypothesis
for both directions. So the results reveal that there is bidirectional causality between
growth and poverty. The coe¢ cients of the test equations for poverty and the income
variable show negative signs in both directions, indicating that higher income growth
15However this development is contradictory with the results of Wan, Lu and Chen (2006) and Wan
(2004) who argue that a U-pattern is supported by the Chinese data.
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Granger causes a reduction in poverty and vice versa. This result supports the cur-
rent literature and indicates that changes in mean income consistently play the main
role in securing changes in poverty. This result is also in line with the results of
the previous analysis where we nd negative short-run and long-run e¤ects between
growth and poverty for a panel of developing countries and all income and geographic
subpanels. With regard to the other direction an increase in poverty Granger causes
an economic slowdown. It becomes apparent that prevalent poverty has a detri-
mental impact on productivity and erodes the productive capacity of the economy.
Goudie and Ladd (1999) argue that credit market imperfections arising from asym-
metric information prevent the poor from taking up productive investment options,
particularly in human capital. So a reduction in poverty would reduce the number
of typically credit constrained people, and lead to greater economic growth.
3. Finally, the last two rows of Table 4.9 present the results concerning the causal
relationships between inequality and poverty. Whereas the hypothesis that inequality
does not cause poverty cannot be rejected,16 the Wald test rejects the non-causality
hypothesis for the direction running from poverty to inequality. This means that
decreasing poverty generates an increase in inequality. Although for the last years
the headcount index shows a decreasing trend, this decline could not generate a
benecial e¤ect on inequality reduction. This means that though the income of the
poor increased and a fraction of the poor could pass the poverty line the income
of the non-poor increased in such a degree that even so the extent of inequality
increased. With regard to the theory the results conrm the fundamental theoretical
relations and indicate that increasing capital intensity favours asset income, which
leads to more inequality as long as the share of asset holders remains rather stable.
At the same time, increasing capital intensity improves labour productivity, and an
16A reason for this insignicant result could be attributed to opposite impacts of inequality on poverty
for the rural and urban sector. While the correlation between the lagged value of inequality and poverty is
negative (-0.27) for the urban sector the rural sector exhibits only a small positive correlation (0.01).
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increasing number of people can pass the poverty line, so that decreasing poverty
and increasing inequality are connected through capital intensity. Furthermore, Yao,
Zhang and Hanmer (2004) suggest that the speed of poverty reduction is a¤ected by
the degree of inequality. They argue that the slow progress in reducing poverty has
been caused by rising inequality, particularly the urbanrural divide and interregional
inequality. However, recapitulatory the results are quite unexpected particularly with
regard to the results of the general analysis of the developing world where we identify
positive causal relations between inequality and poverty in both directions. Possible
causes for these contradictory results are the use of two di¤erent methodologies based
on the presence of a cointegration and the pooling of the urban and rural data since
it ignores possible heterogenous mechanics of action.
The transfer of the general analysis on the case of China turns out to be problematic
particularly with regard to data availability. Since inequality and poverty variables are
not available for China at provincial level the procedural method applied on the panel of
developing countries is adopted on a di¤erently structured panel of urban and rural growth,
inequality and poverty in China. Besides that the cointegration relationship identied in
the case of the developing world is missing on the rural-urban level in China which translates
into a selection of di¤erent empirical methodologies. Consequently, the comparability of the
results is limited since the analysis is based on the concept of Granger causality whereas the
analysis of the developing world is based on ECM. In summary, the results of the Granger
causality tests reveal that despite di¤erent methodological conditions to some extent the
causality relations in China are in line with the general results for the developing world.
In particular, the Granger tests between income growth and poverty conrm the negative
relationship between both variables, however, inequality and growth and inequality and
poverty show di¤erent interdependencies.
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4.5 Summary and conclusion
Growth, inequality and poverty are central elements for evaluating development. After
reviewing the current literature, we recall some fundamental theoretical relations between
growth, income inequality and poverty. In the empirical section we check the stationarity
of the data using two common panel unit root tests, the IPS test by Im, Pesaran and Shin
(2003) and the Fisher-type test by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). Pairwise
cointegration is tested using the panel cointegration test developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004).
This test allows for heterogeneity in the panel by permitting heterogenous slope coe¢ cients,
xed e¤ects and individual specic deterministic trends. In a further step the causality
relations are analysed by applying GMM techniques to an error correction model (ECM)
to estimate the pairwise short-run and long-run dynamics for income growth and changes
in inequality and poverty. First, we apply the methodology on a large panel of developing
countries. The analysis is based on the World Bank´s PovcalNet database. This database,
the result of the work of Chen and Ravallion (2007), includes data on income and poverty
and inequality measures for a large number of developing countries. Our analysis uses a
balanced panel of 114 countries for the period 1981-2005; also the panel is split into three
subpanels according to per capita income and six subpanels according to its geographical
location. The results of the error correction regressions conrm the theoretical model and
show that all pairs of variables exhibit a causal relationship in both directions and that
growth, distribution and poverty reduction are strongly interrelated. While growth and
inequality exhibit a positive bidirectional causal e¤ect, the relationship between growth and
poverty is negative, indicating that growth indeed reduces poverty. Yet the results also show
that the level of development a¤ects the poverty-reducing e¤ect of growth. Income growth
has beneted the poor regions far less. Furthermore, there appears to be a positive causality
between inequality and poverty, suggesting that a successful poverty reduction strategy
requires both economic growth and a sound redistribution policy. The second part of the
analysis focuses on China and uses rural and urban data form 1981 to 2001 to investigate
111
the interdependencies between growth, inequality and poverty for a single country. The
results for China support the negative relationship between growth and poverty, however
inequality and growth and inequality and poverty show negative interdependencies.
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Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
Since the economic reform the Peoples Republic of China has recorded a remarkably
high level of economic growth. As industrialisation, specialisation, FDI and trade raised
economic growth and living standards in China, poverty has fallen dramatically over the
last two decades. Since 1978, China alone accounted for most of the worlds decline in
poverty. Even though there has been a huge rise in income inequality within the country,
between the provinces and between rural and urban China, economic growth has been so
strong that hundreds of millions of people have risen out of extreme poverty and the poverty
headcount has sunk. However, since the favourable open door policy was restricted mainly
to the coastal region, the eastern provinces have experienced much higher growth rates
than the central and western region. This uneven development strategy has caused rising
inequality within China and poverty reduction has been very uneven across provinces.
It becomes apparent that economic growth, inequality and poverty are mutually in-
terdependent phenomena: growth rate a¤ects distribution and distribution a¤ects growth,
in turn both have an impact on poverty reduction, and poverty in turn e¤ects inequality
and growth. For this reason this thesis highlights all three aspects and their potential
relationships to reveal a complete picture of Chinas development process. The goal of the
thesis is to identify sources of successful development. Furthermore, we analyse how the
unequal distribution of these development sources across Chinas provinces attributes to
the interprovincial inequality in income. Finally, we focus on the interdependence of these
variables and analyse the causal directions in the long and in the short run.
The uneven provincial development raises the question concerning the sustainability
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of the successful development process. We nd a catching up, non-steady state process
across Chinas provinces indicating that the provinces are on a converging path. This
result shows promise for a comprehensive expansion of the successful development. The
poorer provinces can catch up to the richer ones, leading to a decline in the countrys
inequality. Analysing the factors of provincial growth we nd two sources of development.
On the one hand international integration in terms of trade and FDI is driving growth
through the channels of imitation of international technologies, technology spill-overs and
dynamic scale e¤ects. On the other hand domestic capital in terms of physical capital
and human capital also shows a highly signicant positive e¤ect on GDP growth. This
result indicates that Chinas success story is not solely driven by internationalisation and
opening up but also by domestic sources. Regarding human capital, higher education seems
to play a far more important role than primary and secondary education, this result is also
reected in the analysis of the determinants of inequality where secondary education enters
insignicantly while the falling inequality in higher education has a signicant contribution
to the reduction of inequality.
The inequality analysis identies a falling inequality between 1978 and 1990 and a rise
in inequality in the subsequent period, which is mainly driven by the inequality between
the western, central and eastern region and within the eastern region. This result indicates
that the preferential policy of the coastal region accelerated the development process on
the one hand, on the other hand the uneven promotion led to a rising inequality not only
across China but also in the eastern region itself. The distributions of physical capital,
trade and infrastructure also show a rise in inequality in this period, these variables enter
positively signicant as determinants of income inequality. On the contrary FDI and human
capital inequality show a decreasing trend leading to a decline in income inequality, which
is identied by negative signicant regression coe¢ cients. More specically, it is apparent
that disparities in growth determinants raise income inequality while a decline in the factor
inequality involves a decline in income inequality.
The analysis of the causal directions between growth, inequality and poverty conrms
the interdependent relationship of these variables, the results show that income growth,
distribution and poverty reduction are strongly interrelated. Concerning the long-run re-
lationship between growth, inequality and poverty we nd a cointegration relationship
between these variables for a panel of 114 developing countries, however, analysing solely
China there is a lack of long-run relations. With regard to income growth and poverty the
results show a negative causal connection in both directions in the long and in the short
run. Furthermore, the level of development a¤ects the causal e¤ects. While the poverty-
reducing e¤ect of growth is stronger for wealthier countries, the growth e¤ect of poverty
reduction is stronger in poorer countries. For China the short-run results are consistent
with the country panel ndings. As expected growth has a poverty reducing e¤ect, the
growth process raises not only the mean income but also the income of the poor leading
to a decrease in the headcount. Besides that, we nd positive causality relations between
growth and inequality and between inequality and poverty in the country panel analysis;
however, the analysis of China shows negative causality directions running from growth to
inequality and from poverty to inequality. This indicates that the rural region is in the
process of catching up to the urban region which reduces the inequality in China.
In summary, the challenge for policy makers is to create an incentive scheme that
promotes not only the eastern region but in particular the central and western region. The
government has to nd the right combination of growth-promoting policies with the right
policies to assure that the poor can participate fully in the opportunities unleashed, and
so contribute to that growth. The right combination can help China to continue the rapid
poverty reduction of the last decades, to broaden growth across China and so to reduce
interprovincial inequality. For example, China has started a wave of preferential policies
for Chinas western development, which is mainly focused on taxation, land and favourable
conditions for foreign capital utilisation. Future research can help to identify the gains and
implications of these policy directions.
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Appendix
A1.1 Divisions of administrative areas and geographical classication
in China
With an area of 9.6 Million square kilometres the Peoples Republic of China, in the fol-
lowing abbreviated as China, is the third biggest country in the world, next to Russia and
Canada, and with a population of 1.3 Billion the most populous country in the world.
Chinas capital is Beijing and the country abuts on 14 neighbour states. It ranges 4500
km from north to south and 4200 km from east to west with a coast line of 18000 km of
the mainland and 14000 km of the island. Because of its size it does not astonish that
within the country there are huge distinctions in climate, habitability and physical alti-
tude. Regarding the subdivision of the country on the provincial level China is divided
into 23 provinces, 5 municipalities and 2 autonomous regions. Administratively, the coun-
try is classied into three regions: east, central and west. The eastern region consists
of nine coastal provinces Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guang-
dong, Hainan and Guangxi and three municipalities Tianjin, Beijing, and Shanghai. The
central region includes nine provinces and autonomous regions consisting of Heilongjiang,
Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi. Lastly, the west-
ern region covers the ten provinces and autonomous regions of Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia,
Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Tibet.1 Another classica-
tion divides China into two regions, the coastal and the interior. Here the coastal region is
equivalent to the eastern region, the central and western regions correspond to the interior
region. Table A1.1 and Figure A1.1 give a recapitulatory overview of the provinces and
their characteristics.
1 In 1997 Chongqing which used to be part of Sichuan became a separate province.
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Table A1.1: Chinas provinces and their characteristics
Province Area in km2 Population Capital
Liaoning 148000 4375 Shenyang
Hebei 188000 7194 Shijiazhuang
Tianjin 11900 1299 Tianjin
Beijing 16410 1962 Beijing
Shandong 157000 9588 Jinan
Jiangsu 103000 7869 Nanjing
Shanghai 6000 2303 Shanghai
Zhejiang 102000 5447 Hangzhou
Fujian 121400 3693 Fuzhou
Guangdong 180000 10441 Guangzhou
Hainan 35000 869 Haikou
Guangxi 237000 4610 Nanning
Heilongjiang 454000 3833 Harbin
Jilin 187000 2747 Changchun
Inner Mongolia 1183000 2472 Hohhot
Shanxi 156000 3735 Taiyuan
Henan 167000 9405 Zhengzhou
Anhui 139000 5957 Hefei
Hubei 186000 5728 Wuhan
Hunan 211800 6570 Changsha
Jiangxi 167000 4462 Nanchang
Shaanxi 206000 3735 Xian
Gansu 454000 2560 Lanzhou
Ningxia 66000 633 Yinchuan
Sichuan 485000 8045 Chengdu
Chongqing 82000 2885 Chongquing
Yunnan 394000 4602 Kunming
Guizhou 176000 3479 Guiyang
Qinghai 697000 563 Xining
Xinjiang 1665000 2185 Urumqi
Tibet 1228000 301 Lhasa
Population in 10000 (2010)
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Figure A11: Chinas provinces
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A1.2 Economic development in China
Economic development in China can be divided into two periods, i.e., the pre-reform period
(1949 1977) and the reform period (after 1978).
The pre-reform period began on Oct, 1st 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) under Mao Zedong formally established the Peoples Republic of China. Economic
development was impressive in this period. The main targets that Mao had were adapt-
ing Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese conditions, abatement of ination, improvement of
infrastructure and building up of agriculture. The economic history since 1953 is charac-
terized by Five-Year-Plans in which the economic and social objectives were set for the
following ve years.
The First-Five-Year-Plan (1953-1957) designates the transition to socialism based on
the Soviet model. The economic policy under Mao Zedong was a¤ected by the introduction
of a centrally planned economy that called for collectivisation of agriculture and political
centralisation. The main objective of this plan was a quickest possible industrialisation,
which was to be supported by a socialized agriculture.
A new economic campaign under the name The Great Leap Forward instituted the
second Five-Year period in 1958. This social and economic plan aimed to accomplish the
technical progress and economic development of the country and transform China from a
primarily agrarian economy into a modern, leading industrial power.
Following the Soviet model, Mao saw grain and steel production and a massive supply
of cheap labour as the main sources of success for the industrial sector. However, the con-
centration on the heavy industry led to a disregard of the agricultural sector. To resolve
the disadvantages, Mao introduces a new socioeconomic and political system - the peoples
communes. Each commune was planned as an independent and self-contained economic
unit and assumed the responsibility for trade, investment, education, industry, agriculture
and planning. Decentralisation of agriculture, basic technologies and co-operation of me-
chanical and manpower should be the key to economic development. The Great Leap
Forwardwas an economic disaster, the produced commodities were of inferior quality and
the chaos of the restructuring and the rural collectivisation disabled the agriculture and
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resulted in a famine, it is estimated that the number of dead constituted several millions.
The failure of the campaign resulted in a change of government. As a political consequence
Mao Zedong resigned his position as president in 1959, although remained chairman of
the CCP and Liu Shaqi was elected as his successor. With a readjustment the economy
recovered rapidly and the agricultural achievements strengthen the new president.
However, with the support of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques,
Mao gradually regained more and more control and initiated the cultural revolution in
1966. With the objective of establishing a communistic world all culture which didnt
comply with the proletarian pattern was oppressed and prohibited, millions of intellectuals
who were blamed for the capitalistic idea were relocated to rural areas, adverse literature,
art and cultural assets were destroyed. The isolated foreign policy and the calamity brought
by the revolution resulted in massive setbacks for China and manifested into an economic,
political and social chaos.
The reform period started in 1978. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 a power
struggle broke out in which Deng Xiaoping prevailed and became the leader of the new
government. This political change ushered in a new era. The new government implemented
scores of economic reforms which are known as the Four Modernisations. The goal was
to strengthen the sectors of agriculture, industry, technology and defence. The rst stage
from 1978 to 1983 is characterised by a reform in the agricultural sector as a result of the
replacement of the Commune system with the household responsibility system. Thereupon
the government also promoted non-agricultural activities such as village enterprises in
rural areas and forward the more self-management for the state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Emphasis was put on the development of the home market as well as on the opening
to the outside world. In this phase China established a stable relationship to foreign
trading enterprises, developed its economic relations with the rest of the world and began
to promote an open-door policy. As the centrally planned actions encountered its limits
and lost e¤ectiveness, an important component of the economic reforms was the formation
of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). In 1979 the government started a stepwise opening
up of Chinas domestic markets with the objective of integrating them into the global
economy. The rst four SEZs were set up in the provinces Guangdong and Fujian as
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an experiment and aimed to introduce an external market-oriented economic system. To
attract foreign capital these zones were encouraged with preferential policies such as duty
and tax incentives, build-up of a better infrastructure, reduction of bureaucracy and more
exible labour and wage policy and gained autonomy of decision. Economic development
in the SEZs proved to be extremely successful so that the government decided to extend
further preferential zones and opened 14 coastal cities in 1984 followed by Hainan in 1988
and Shanghai in 1989. SOEs had to rival with private and foreign enterprises.
Since the implementation of economic reforms and opening up to the world market
China experienced a continuously high rate of annual growth. The unprecedented boom
in foreign direct investment (FDI), and the sustained increase in trade were of impressive
dimensions. This positive economic development induced an enormous improvement in the
standard of living for China and had an important impact on the global economy regarding
the e¤ect of foreign investment decision and international trade.
However, because the open door policy was restricted to only a few cities and the
economic boom did not spread out across the rest of China, it promoted only a few provinces
in the coastal area. The shady side of this economic success story was a rising inequality
within the country and lasting poverty in rural areas.
A2.1 Determining the aggregate production level of the region
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A2.2 Steady state determination and reactions of !i when Hi; Ki,  i,
 exi and  are changing
Solve for _! by plugging in:
_!i(t) = G(t)
G
i F (t)
F
i   !(t);
_!i(t) = 
G

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F
y(t)i   !(t)
yi = !
1
1 
i H

1 
i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
 
1 
K
1  
1 
i
_!i(t) = 
G

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F

!(t)
1
1 
i H

1 
i (
(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
)

1 K
1  
1 
i

  !(t)
_!i(t) = 
G

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1   
H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!(t)

1 
i   !(t):
d _!i(t)
d!(t)
=

1  	i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!(t)
 1+
1 
i   1 < 0
as Hi and Ki are assumed to be su¢ ciently small
To simplify, this equation is rewritten as
_!i(t) = 	i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!(t)

1    !(t) see (2.7)
with 	i : = G

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1  
:
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solve for the steady state position:
0 = _!i(t) = 	i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!

1    !
! = 	i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!

1 
! = 	
(1 )
(1  )
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  )
	
(1 )
(1  )
i = 
G
(1 )
(1  )
i ('i)
F (1 )+
(1  )
!i = 
G
(1 )
(1  )
i ('i)
F (1 )+
(1  )

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  )
see (2.8)
Steady state reactions @!

i
@Ki
:
!i = 	
(1 )
(1  )
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  )
@!i
@Ki
=
(1  )
1     
1     
1   	
1 
1  
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  ) 1
K
1  
1   1
i H

1 
i
=
(1     )
1      !

iK
 1
i > 0;
Steady state reactions @!

i
@ i
:
@!i
@ i
=
(1  )
(1     )	

(1  )
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  ) @	i
@ i
@	i
@ i
=  

F +

1   

G

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1   1 (1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
 1i
=  

F +

1   

G

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1  
 1i =  

F +

1   

	i
 1
i
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@!i
@ i
=   (1  )
(1     )	

(1  )
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  )

F +

1   

	i
 1
i
=  

(1  )
(1     )
 
F +

1   

! 1i < 0 see (2.9)
Steady state reactions @!

i
@exi
:
@!i
@ exi
=
(1  )
(1     )	

(1  )
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  ) @	i
@ exi
@	i
@ exi
=  

F +

1   

G

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1   1 
 ir
=  

F +

1   

	i(1   exi ) 1
@!i
@ exi
=   (1  )
(1     )	

(1  )
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  )

F +

1   

	i(1   exi ) 1
=   (1  )
(1     )

F +

1   

!i (1   exi ) 1 see (2.11)
Steady state reactions @!

i
@i
:
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@!i
@i
=
(1  )!i
(1     )	
 1
i
@	i
@i
d	i
di
= G
G 1
i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1  
 

F +

1   

Gi

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1   1 (1   exi )
 ir
= 	i

G
 1
i  

F +

1   

(1  i) 1

@!i
@i
=
(1  )!i
(1     )

G
 1
i  

F +

1   

(1  i) 1

see (2.12)
A2.3 Optimal level of government activities
max
i
! = 	
(1 )
(1  )
i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i
 (1 )
(1  )
	i := 
G
i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1  
@!i
@i
=
(1  )!i
(1     )	
 1
i
@	i
@i
d	i
di
= 	i

G
 1
i  

F +

1   

(1  i) 1

= 0
G = i

F +

1   

(1  i) 1
i =
G
F +

1   + G

@!i
@i
=
!i
1  	
 1
i
@	i
@i
with
@	i
@i
8>>><>>>:
> 0 i < 

i underinvestment, undertaxation
= 0 for i = 

i growth maximizing tax rate
< 0 i > 

i overinvestment, overtaxation
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Table A2.2: Variance ination factors
Variable model 1 model 2 model 3
yi;t 1 3.65 3.40 3.67
4Ki;t 1.23 1.24 1.17
4POPi;t 1.05 1.05 1.09
4HCi;t 1.04 1.43 1.35
4FDIi;t 1.19
4Ti;t 1.09 1.34
4GOV 1i;t 1.75 1.73 1.83
4GOV 2i;t 1.79 1.74 2.10
POPKM2i;t 1.67 1.68 1.76
URBANi;t 2.76 2.69 3.10
4MARKETi;t 1.24
Mean VIF 1.83 1.78 1.87
A3.1 Determining the aggregate production level of the province
yi = AiH

i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
yi

K1  i
y1 i = AiH

i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir

K1  i
yi = Ai
1
1 H

1 
i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
 
1 
K
1  
1 
i
Yi =
yi
A
1
1 
hence Yi = !i
1
1 H

1 
i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
 
1 
K
1  
1 
i
A3.2 Determining export values by a household decision and interna-
tional capital costs
max : U = C Im1 ;
s:t: : 0 = y (1  i)   irFi   Ci   pi(1   exi ) Imi
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FOC :
dUi
dCi
= C 1i Im
1 
i = 1;
dUi
d Imi
= (1  )Ci Im i = pi(1   exi )
[1  ] (1  i) yi   Ci = (1  ) [1  (1   exi )] (1  i) yi
Exi
yi
= "i = (1  ) [1  (1   exi )] (1  i)
A3.3 Steady state determination and reactions of !i when Hi; Ki,  i,
 exi and  are changing
Solve for _! by plugging in:
_!i(t) = (G(t)i)
G (F (t)i)
F (Ex(t)i)
Ex   !(t);
_!i(t) = A

1 

A
  1
1  y(t)i
G 
A
  1
1  (1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
y(t)i
F 
A
  1
1  "iy(t)i
Ex
i
  !(t)
yi = A
1
1 
i H

1 
i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
 
1 
K
1  
1 
i
_!i(t) = 
G

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1  
"Exi

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!(t)

1 
i   !(t):
d _!i(t)
d!(t)
=

1  	i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!(t)
 1+
1 
i   1 < 0
as Hi and Ki are assumed to be su¤. small
To simplify, this equation is rewritten as
_!i(t) = 	i

H

1 
i K
1  
1 
i

!(t)

1    !(t) see (3.10)
with 	i : = 
G
i

(1   exi ) (1  i)
 ir
F+ 1  
"Exi : see (3.12)
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Solve for the steady state position:
0 = _!i(t)
0 = 	i

H
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i K
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 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i

!

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   !
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
(1   exi ) (1  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see (3.11)
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i > 0; see (3.13)
Steady state reactions @!

i
@ i
:
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Steady state reactions @!
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A3.4 Slope of the nal development curve 
D
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Properties of the curve:
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A3.5 Slope of the nal development curve 
D, identical provinces:
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A3.6 Dynamic adjustment
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A3.7 Reaction of the nal development curve 
D, d
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d
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< 0 see (3.14)
d
D
d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=
1
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@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< 0 see (3.15)
A3.8 Determining the domestic interest rate
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Slope of the interest parity curve :
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A3.9 Slope of the interest parity curve, identical provinces
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A3.10 Reactions of the interest parity curve
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A3.11 Relative slope of the nal development position and the interest
parity condition for identical provinces
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A3.12 Equilibrium reaction of local capital allocation
As we start from point B0 in g 34 we have identical provinces in the starting position:
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Figure A31: Theil index of eastern China and provincial contribution
(1978-2004)
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Figure A32: Theil index of central China and provincial contribution
(1978-2004)
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Figure A33: Theil index of western China and provincial contribution
(1978-2004)
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Figure A34: GDP Theil index and provincial contribution (1991-2004)
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Figure A35: Capital Theil index and provincial contribution (1991-2004)
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Figure A36: Human capital (higher education) Theil index and provin-
cial contribution (1991-2004)
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Figure A37: Trade Theil index and provincial contribution (1991-2004)
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Figure A38: FDI Theil index and provincial contribution (1991-2004)
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Figure A39: Government expenditure (administration) Theil index and
provincial contribution (1991-2004)
157
Figure A310: Government expenditure (culture, education, science and
public health) Theil index and provincial contribution (1991-2004)
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Figure A311: Highway Theil index and provincial contribution (1991-
2004)
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Table A3.1: OLS and GMM estimation
Dependent variable: TH_GDPi;t
OLS GMM-DIFF
Coe¤. Std. Err. Coe¤. Std. Err.
TH_Ki;t 0.660*** (0.011) 0.379*** (0.147)
TH_HCi;t -0.047*** (0.012) 0.041 (0.032)
TH_Ti;t 0.029*** (0.005) 0.097*** (0.024)
TH_FDIi;t -0.010 (0.010) -0.036* (0.021)
TH_GOV 1i;t -0.002 (0.003) -0.284 (0.350)
TH_GOV 2i;t -0.194*** (0.021) -0.528*** (0.186)
TH_HIGHWAYi;t 0.101*** (0.034) -0.030 (0.070)
R2 0.9827
adj. R2 0.9824
Sargan test (P-value) 0.353
AR1 (P-value) 0.464
AR2 (p-value) 0.475
Obs. 389 361
Note: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Robust standard errors
GMM based on the two-step di¤erence estimator
Table A3.2: Variance ination factors
Variable VIF
theilc 3.40
theilhc2 5.45
theiltrade 2.61
theilfdi 2.23
theilgov1 1.54
theilgov2 1.64
theilhighway 7.78
Mean VIF 3.52
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A4.1 Country set
The countries included in the analysis are:
low-income:
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Dem. Rep. Congo, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,
Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda.
lower-middle-income:
Angola, Armenia, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Côte dIvoire,
Djibouti, Arab Rep. Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala*, Guyana*,
India-Rural, India-Urban, Indonesia-Rural, Indonesia-Urban, Lao PDR, Lesotho,
Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Turk-
menistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.
upper-middle-income and high-income:
Albania, Algeria, Argentina-Urban, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China-Rural, China-Urban, Costa Rica, Croa-
tia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Gabon, Hungary, Is-
lamic Rep. Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, St. Lucia, Suriname, Thailand, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, RB Venezuela.
East Asia and Pacic:
Cambodia, China-Rural, China-Urban, Indonesia-Rural, Indonesia-Urban, Lao PDR,
Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet-
nam.
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Europe and Central Asia:
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Middle East and North Africa:
Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Arab Republic, Iran, Islamic Republic, Jordan, Morocco,
Tunisia, Yemen.
South Asia:
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India-Rural, India-Urban, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dem. Rep. Congo, Côte dIvoire, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia.
Table A4.1: Correlation matrix
growth inequality
growth 1.0000
inequality 0.0796 1.0000
poverty -0.7533 0.1104
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Figure A41: Change in inequality and growth
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Figure A43: Change in poverty and change in inequality
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Table A4.8: Estimated Granger causality model: changes in inequality
and income growth
Dependent Variables  ln income
Coef. Std. Err.
 ln incomet 1 0.3202* (0.1826)
 ln incomet 2 0.1416*** (0.0350)
 ln ginit 1 -0.0663*** (0.0063)
 ln ginit 2 -0.2322*** (0.0635)
Wald test 3.69 (0.1577)
Sargan test (P-value) 44.7523 (0.6067)
AR1 test -1.4132 (0.1576)
AR2 test -0.9117 (0.3619)
Observations 36
Asymptotically robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
170
Table A4.9: Estimated Granger causality model: income growth and
changes in inequality
Dependent Variables  ln gini
Coef. Std. Err.
 ln ginit 1 -0.2427*** (0.0899)
 ln ginit 2 -0.1667*** (0.0414)
 ln incomet 1 -0.5398** (0.2239)
 ln incomet 2 -0.3067** (0.1396)
Wald test 13.36 (0.0003)
Sargan test (P-value) 40.0319 (0.7864)
AR1 test -1.3881 (0.1651)
AR2 test 0.8241 (0.4099)
Observations 36
Asymptotically robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table A4.10: Estimated Granger causality model: income growth and
changes in poverty
Dependent Variables  ln h
Coef. Std. Err.
 ln ht 1 -0.3571*** (0.0145)
 ln incomet 1 -5.0525** (2.3890)
Wald test 4.47 (0.0344)
Sargan test (P-value) 52.7787 (0.4438)
AR1 test -1.1409 (0.2539)
AR2 test -1.3629 (0.1729)
Observations 38
Asymptotically robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table A4.11: Estimated Granger causality model: changes in poverty
and income growth
Dependent Variables  ln income
Coef. Std. Err.
 ln incomet 1 0.3504* (0.1859)
 ln incomet 2 0.2008** (0.0929)
 ln ht 1 -0.0247*** (0.0033)
 ln ht 2 -0.0173*** (0.0032)
Wald test 6.09 (0.0477)
Sargan test (P-value) 46.8215 (0.5211)
AR1 test -1.4142 (0.1573)
AR2 test 1.3886 (0.1650)
Observations 36
Asymptotically robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table A4.12: Estimated Granger causality model: changes in inequality
and changes in poverty
Dependent Variables  ln h
Coef. Std. Err.
 ln ht 1 -0.0702** (0.0305)
 ln ht 2 -0.4190*** (0.0822)
 ln ginit 1 -2.6571*** (0.2849)
 ln ginit 2 1.9821*** (0.4676)
Wald test 4.31 (0.1159)
Sargan test (P-value) 50.3973 (0.3788)
AR1 test -1.1189 (0.2632)
AR2 test -1.0608 (0.2888)
Observations 36
Asymptotically robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table A4.13: Estimated Granger causality model: changes in poverty
and changes in inequality
Dependent Variables  ln gini
Coef. Std. Err.
 ln ginit 1 -0.3309*** (0.0775)
 ln ginit 2 0.1113** (0.0553)
 ln ht 1 -0.0124*** (0.0041)
 ln ht 2 -0.0516*** (0.0103)
Wald test 5.61 (0.0605)
Sargan test (P-value) 49.5233 (0.4122)
AR1 test -1.2514 (0.2108)
AR2 test -0.6424 (0.5206)
Observations 36
Asymptotically robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
